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INTRODUCTION

In the winter of 1936–37, Flint, Michigan, played host to perhaps
the most significant event in the history of American labor. Hundreds of striking automobile workers seized several factories in a
General Motors (GM) production complex and held them for six
weeks despite attempts by local authorities and GM agents to oust
them. In taking control of the factories, the strikers aimed to force
the company to accept their right to form a union of their choice and
to compel GM to recognize and bargain with it, as required by the
newly enacted Wagner Act. GM’s inability to reclaim its factories led
to a near-complete shutdown of its operations nationwide and eventually caused the company to surrender to the strikers’ main demands. The boldness and tenacity of these “sit-down” strikers and
their unexpected victory over this immensely powerful and stridently
anti-union corporation catalyzed a nationwide wave of hundreds of
sit-down strikes over the next several months. The strikes would
eventually prove critical to overcoming entrenched employer resistance to basic labor rights and bringing about, for the first time in
American history, extensive unionization of the industrial workforce.
The sit-down strikes represent a tremendously important chapter
in American history. Although the historical literature on the strikes
remains surprisingly thin, historians have stressed the strikes’ integral
function in enabling the organization of industrial labor, thereby determining the subsequent course of the labor movement and the po1
litical economy of twentieth century America. Legal scholars have
also confronted the legacy of the sit-down strikes. Karl Klare and
James Pope, among others, have demonstrated the strikes’ essential
role in overcoming judicial and political opposition to the Wagner
2
Act and making way for a viable system of labor law. Scholars like
Klare and Pope have also called attention to ways that the lawful prohibition of these strikes, which took shape following the GM strike,
altered the character of the labor movement. These measures helped
suppress more radical and progressive tendencies, laying the
groundwork for the stagnation and morbidity that characterized the

1
See, e.g., SIDNEY FINE, SIT-DOWN: THE GENERAL MOTORS STRIKE OF 1936–1937
(1969); ROBERT H. ZIEGER, THE CIO: 1935–1955, at 46–61 (1995); Michael Torigan,
The Occupation of the Factories: Paris 1936, Flint 1937, 41 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 324
(1999).
2
Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional
Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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course of the labor movement over the latter half of the twentieth
3
century.
This scholarship is valuable for exposing the social and political
consequences of the sit-down strikes and countering a tendency
among many students and scholars of labor to either ignore the sitdown strikes completely or dismiss them as aberrant and episodic
4
phenomena with few lasting consequences. In fact, the sit-down
strikes influenced the evolution of modern labor law in ways that legal scholars and labor historians have yet to explore fully. To be sure,
scholars such as Klare and Pope have examined this issue in the context of how the legal campaign against the sit-down strikes shaped the
immediate course of labor law as well as the overall jurisprudential
5
landscape of labor relations. Despite these efforts, there remains an
absence of a thorough accounting of the strikes’ lasting impact on
the practical content of labor law itself and, most especially, how the
strikes transformed the contours of the right to strike.
Tracing the legacy of the sit-down strikes is important for two
major reasons. The first reason is practical. As this Article demonstrates, legal and political attacks on labor rights that were originally
aimed at the sit-down strikes have metastasized into a more general
campaign to prohibit a broad range of militant strike practices, even
those bearing little outward resemblance to the original sit-down
strikes. The consequences for organized labor have been quite grave,
as this dynamic helped eviscerate the right to strike and, in effect,
deprived labor of weapons it desperately needs to mount any meaningful challenge to the entrenched power of employers in the
workplace. In this way, the reaction to the strikes helps to account
for the dire state in which organized labor finds itself today. Bringing
this out is important not so much because it reveals some simple legal
formula for rebuilding labor rights; to the contrary, it is important
because it speaks to the tremendous difficulties that await any such
effort. Indeed, this Article argues that the reactionary legacy of the
sit-down strikes suggests inherent, perhaps insuperable limits that
may appertain to the right to strike in liberal society.
3

See generally Pope, supra note 2; Jim Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes,
and the Shaping of American Industrial Relations, 1935–1958, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 45
(2006); Ahmed A. White, Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion of
New Deal Labor Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 275, 335–50 (2004).
4
Leading labor law textbooks, for example, typically mention the strikes and the
legal decisions they generated only in passing. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR
LAW 76–80, 573 (14th ed. 2006); MICHAEL HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW 212 (6th ed.
2003).
5
See sources cited supra note 3.
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The second reason is more academic, as it concerns the state of
literature on this subject and the contribution that a thorough accounting of the consequences of the sit-down strikes can make to our
understanding of the phenomenon. As this Article stresses, the historical meaning of the strikes is necessarily intertwined with the political and legal results that flowed from them. To the extent that these
consequences have not been fully revealed, the historical understanding of the strikes remains fundamentally incomplete.
The legal legacy of the sit-down strikes is anchored by two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that addressed the
strikes’ legality under labor law. Decided within a few years of the
Court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of the Wagner Act,
6
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. and Southern Steamship Co. v.
7
NLRB held that sit-down strikes are illegal and that sit-down strikers
may not benefit from the authority of the National Labor Relations
Board (the NLRB or Board) to protect workers from employers’ assaults on labor rights with the usual remedies of reinstatement and
8
back pay. More subtly, the Court in Fansteel and Southern Steamship
also acceded to the criminal prosecution of sit-down strikers by state
and federal officials, as did the Board in its litigation of these cases.
These initial responses to the sit-down strikes would outline a much
broader program of limiting the right to strike, involving the federal
courts, Congress, the Board, and state and local police and judges. In
each of these institutional contexts, the Fansteel and Southern Steamship
cases not only provided a legal foundation on which expanded attacks on the right to strike could be based, but also tethered to their
analysis the specter of ungoverned labor militancy and the fiction of a
Board and system of labor rights that was (at least until the 1947
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act) too tolerant of labor’s excesses. It
is by these means that the sit-down strikes have served to limit the
Board’s authority under the labor law to protect strikers from employer reprisals, particularly where strikers engage in excessively confrontational or militant tactics; provided a jurisprudential rationale
for courts to aggressively police the Board’s adherence to this program; and justified a weak view of the preemptive effect of federal labor law, thereby paving the way for states and local governments to
use their criminal laws to impose their own limits on the right to
strike.

6
7
8

306 U.S. 240 (1939).
316 U.S. 31 (1941).
Id. at 38, 40–41, 48; Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 253, 255–56, 258, 261.
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Although they have featured other aims, the immediate goal of
most sit-down strikes was to prevent employers from resuming production with replacement workers and crossovers, a goal that, if executed successfully, all but negates the value of a traditional strike.
For this reason, sit-down strikes actually continued to occur well after
Fansteel and Southern Steamship. But with these cases so unequivocally
prohibiting the tactic, strikers seeking to keep their employers’ operations closed have had to turn to other methods, from mass picketing, to blocking streets and plant entrances, to verbal harassment and
physical attacks on strikebreakers. Significantly, the concepts originally developed to penalize sit-down strikes have evolved to prohibit
these alternative tactics as well. This fact reveals the central logic of
this legacy that elevated traditional concepts of private property, authority, and social order above the rights of labor: to enhance the
ability of employers to defeat strikes and related modes of labor protest.
It is through this ideological and practical orientation that the
sit-down strikes speak to the inherent limits of liberal labor law. From
its inception, American labor law has allocated labor rights in a thoroughly liberal fashion that eschews an interventionist, corporatist
model of addressing conflicts between labor and employers. Rather,
American labor law relies on a relatively laissez-faire approach by
which a union’s power ultimately derives from whatever force it can
bring to bear through the strike. Likewise, as reflected in the right it
gives employers to replace strikers and resume business operations,
American labor law abstains from more interventionist or corporatist
9
approaches to the conduct of strikes themselves. For a strike to work
in such a context, the union must of its own accord stop the employer
from carrying on business. And yet, what the sit-down strikes
showed—and have continued to confirm through their legacy—is
that American labor law doggedly embraces liberal concepts of private property, authority, and order in a fashion that effectively denies
workers the only tactics by which they might consistently accomplish
a stoppage of their employer’s business. The result of this fealty to
liberal principles is a system in which the right to strike is prominent
in a formal sense, but available in a meaningful way only for the rare
workers who are economically irreplaceable, politically entrenched,
or otherwise very lucky. Because a meaningful right to strike is so
central to a liberal system of labor rights, the larger consequence of

9

See SYLVESTER PETRO, THE LABOR POLICY OF THE FREE SOCIETY (1957) (summarizing this conception of labor law).
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its devaluation is the inevitable bankruptcy of the entire system of labor rights.
In this legacy, this Article argues, can be found not only the full
significance of the sit-down strikes but, indeed, the foundation of a
great and tragic contradiction: militant unionists brought life to concepts of labor rights through the use of sit-down strikes, and yet those
strikes have since, in the determined hands of labor’s enemies, been
useful for destroying a robust system of labor rights. The strikes are
both the embodiment and symbol of organized labor’s torturous encounter with modern capitalism. For this reason, above all, no one
who hopes to understand the history of labor relations and labor law
in modern America can ignore them.
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part II briefly reviews the
history of sit-down strikes. It emphasizes their origins in early twentieth-century America and their remarkable proliferation in the
1930s. This Part stresses the sit-down strikes’ role in the successful
organization of basic industries, in the Court’s validation of the
Wagner Act, and in employers’ eventual (and contingent) acquiescence to a more or less functional system of labor rights. Part III
then traces the sit-down strikes’ reactionary legacy as it emerged in
the period from 1937 to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947. It begins by reviewing the history of Fansteel and Southern Steamship, and then shows the role that these decisions, the Board’s apparent reaction to them, and the strikes themselves played in Congress’s
and the courts’ roles in opening the door to increasingly pointed attacks on all forms of worker militancy. This Part shows how the
strikes both influenced the enactment of Taft-Hartley and framed key
provisions of that notoriously anti-labor legislation. Part IV continues
this critique by demonstrating how the reactionary framework that
emerged in response to the strikes has continued to influence the
state of labor rights in the decades since Taft-Hartley by limiting the
reinstatement of strikers, facilitating the intervention of state and local officials in labor disputes, and subordinating labor law to other
regimes of federal policy. Part V concludes by elaborating on how
the sit-down strikes’ reactionary legacy brings to light the inherent
limitations of liberal labor law.
II. A LEGACY OF REFORM: SIT-DOWN STRIKES AND THE RISE OF
MODERN LABOR RELATIONS
The influence of the sit-down strikes on the course of labor relations and labor law in the New Deal era has been well chronicled by
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10

labor historians and legal scholars. Although it is not the primary
focus of this Article to critique this literature, a review of its main
themes frames the discussion of the eventual effect of sit-down strikes
on the development of American labor law. To this end, this Part recounts the history of sit-down strikes, from their origins to the GM
strike at Flint, to their role in shaping labor relations in the critical
period of the late 1930s, and finally to their immediate impact on the
course of modern labor relations.
A. The Early History of Sit-Down Strikes
The Flint strike embodied the sit-down strike in its most classic
form: a work stoppage in which the strikers occupied the workplace
to prevent the employer from using it for a considerable period of
time. The concept is, however, quite spectral, contemplating not only the classic “stay-in” strike, but a range of less dramatic tactics, including short, “quickie” strikes, characterized by brief, on-the-job
work stoppages, and “skippy” strikes, characterized by intentionally
11
sloppy performance on the production line. The initial focus of this
Article is the classic stay-in strike. But as will become evident as the
discussion unfolds, the sit-down strike’s different manifestations all
center on a core mode of protest, built around a challenge to the
employer’s traditional prerogatives of property and authority.
Sit-down strikes came into their own during the dramatic clash
of labor and capital in Flint, Michigan, in the winter of 1936–37 and
are forever associated with that moment in history; however, the tactic emerged long before the Flint strike, even though it is impossible
to know with complete certainty when the first sit-down strike oc12
13
curred. Michigan Governor (and future Supreme Court Justice )
Frank Murphy, who performed a delicate balancing act in trying to
mediate the affair in Flint, quite understandably linked the strikes to
the most ancient of origins: the protests of masons building the py14
ramids of Egypt. The particular claim may be debatable, but Murphy’s general point―that protests resembling the modern sit-down
strike surely have occurred since the dawn of civilization―is well taken. Murphy was also able to point to more recent and better-

10

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
IRVING BERNSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933–1941: THE
TURBULENT YEARS 499 (1969); FINE, supra note 1, at 121.
12
See FINE, supra note 1, at 141.
13
J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, at vii (1968).
14
FINE, supra note 1, at 122.
11
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documented examples of sit-down strikes, such as those by builders in
fifteenth-century France and those by textile workers in eighteenth15
century France and nineteenth-century England. Other examples
exist beyond those that Murphy identified. Merchant ships were the
scene of considerable labor protest in the eighteenth century, and
strikes aboard ship were (and remain) like sit-down strikes by their
16
very nature. The sit-down strike was a common—albeit usually brief
and small-scale—feature of maritime labor relations at least through
17
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The first documented sit-down strike in modern America involving factory workers occurred in 1884 in Cincinnati at the Jackson
Brewery Company, when striking brewers barricaded themselves in
18
the establishment and beat back attempts by police to oust them.
An episode resembling things to come unfolded in 1906 at a General
Electric factory in Schenectady, New York, where some 3000 workers
under the leadership of the Industrial Workers of the World occupied the factory to protest the company’s refusal to reinstate three
19
fired union members. The so-called “folded arms” strikers stayed
20
inside for as long as three days.
These examples notwithstanding, the sit-down strike remained
21
relatively uncommon in American labor relations until the 1930s.
The impetus for its increasing popularity in that decade, which foreshadows a major theme in the latter sections of this Article, was the
increasingly aggressive attempt by workers to realize basic labor rights
in the workplace, including the right to organize and compel collective bargaining. Although credit for this upsurge in worker militancy
ultimately belongs to the workers themselves, another factor was a
change in the legal status of labor rights. Until the New Deal, basic
labor rights were all but completely denied to workers by an array of

15

Id.
MARCUS REDIKER, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA: MERCHANT
SEAMEN, PIRATES, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MARITIME WORLD, 1700–1750, at 96–100
(1989).
17
Briton C. Busch, “Brace and Be Dam’d”: Work Stoppages on American Whaleships,
1820–1920, 3 INT’L J. MAR. HIST. 95, 98–99 tbl.1 (1991); White, supra note 3, at 296–
300.
18
FINE, supra note 1, at 122.
19
MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF
THE WORLD 71 (Joseph A. McCartin ed., abr. ed. 2000).
20
BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 499; PHILIP S. FONER, THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF
THE WORLD, 1905–1917, at 88 (1965).
21
See generally FINE, supra note 1, at 121–77 (discussing the emergence and proliferation of the sit-down strike in the early twentieth century).
16
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legal doctrines that served the needs of anti-union employers, including the widespread use of injunctions, the enforcement of anti-radical
statutes, the discriminatory enforcement of everyday criminal laws,
and of course the absence of any laws of consequence affirmatively
22
protecting labor rights. In part because of increasingly strident organizing and effective political activism by labor—and in part because
such changes accommodated a broader shift in political economy
wrought by the Great Depression and the consolidation of monopoly
capital—this condition was dramatically transformed in the early
23
Of particular importance is Congress passing the Norris1930s.
LaGuardia Act in 1932, which significantly limited the ability of em24
ployers to use federal court injunctions to undermine labor rights.
Also important was the 1933 enactment of the National Industrial
25
Although the Supreme Court found the
Recovery Act (NIRA).
26
NIRA unconstitutional soon after its enactment —thus setting the
27
stage for a dramatic reversal in Jones & Laughlin Steel v. NLRB a few
years later—the statute was very much the legislative cornerstone of
28
Section 7(a) of the NIRA
the so-called “First New Deal.”
represented the first attempt by Congress to codify basic labor
29
rights. Although the NIRA offered no real means of enforcing this
provision (and desultory attempts to remedy this by executive order
30
failed), it and the Norris-LaGuardia Act created a sense of overall
change in labor’s legal condition and helped trigger an upsurge in
31
labor-organizing efforts.
From the outset, this wave of union organization drew on militant tactics, including, for the first time in sustained fashion, sit-down
32
strikes. The first modern sit-down strike is generally considered to
have occurred in Austin, Minnesota, in November 1933, when ap-

22

CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS,
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960, at 33–49 (1985).

LAW,

23
See RAYMOND HOLGER, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: LAW,
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 12–14 (2004).
24
Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §101 (2006)).
25
Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195, invalidated by Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935).
26
Schecter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 542.
27
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
28
See HOLGER, supra note 23, at 109.
29
Id. at 108.
30
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 172–85.
31
See id. at 35–125.
32
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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proximately 600 meatpackers seized a Hormel plant in a dispute over
33
wages, working conditions, and the processing of struck livestock.
The strikers “released” the plant two days later after the Minnesota
governor not only mobilized the National Guard but also helped
convince Hormel to agree to arbitration and to abstain from punish34
ing the strikers. The Hormel sit-down strike actually occurred several months after rubber workers in Akron, Ohio, began using the
quickie sit-down strike to counter their employers’ elaborate and ag35
gressive anti-union tactics. But the Hormel strike was a more crucial
manifestation of the tactic. The years 1933 through 1935 saw numerous sit-downs of both kinds, particularly in automobile and rubber
36
factories.
Within a very short time there would be many, many
more.
B. Sit-Down Strikes in the Second New Deal
In 1936, there were forty-eight sit-down strikes (not counting
shipboard strikes) that lasted at least one day; twenty-two of these, in37
volving almost 35,000 total workers, lasted even longer. There were
38
many more sit-down strikes of the short, quickie type as well. Most
of these strikes, regardless of their duration, involved unions affiliated with the CIO (then, the Committee for Industrial Organizing,
and later, the Congress of Industrial Organizations), which had recently been formed by American Federation of Labor (AFL) dissi39
dents intent on organizing the industrial workforce. Between 1936
and 1939, there would be almost 600 major sit-down strikes, most of
which were, again, mounted by industrial workers affiliated with the
40
CIO.
Unlike the 1933 strike at Hormel, the dominant cause of sitdown strikes in the period of the “Second New Deal” was the attempt
by workers to organize unions in the face of vigorous—and often vio33
Strikers Seize Huge Plant; Oust Packing House Owner in Pay Dispute, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Nov. 12, 1933, at 1.
34
Walter Fitzmaurice, Packing Plant Is Surrendered by Strike Army, CHI. DAILY TRIB.,
Nov. 14, 1933, at 5.
35
Louis Adamic, Sitdown: II, THE NATION, Dec. 12, 1936, at 702.
36
FINE, supra note 1, at 123; Daniel Nelson, Origins of the Sit-Down Era: Worker Militancy and Innovation in the Rubber Industry, 1934–38, 23 LAB. HIST. 198, 205–06 (1982).
37
FINE, supra note 1, at 123.
38
See, e.g., Pope, supra note 3, at 53–54 (describing dozens of sit-down strikes in
Goodyear’s Akron, Ohio plant in 1936 alone).
39
FINE, supra note 1, at 123. On the emergence of the CIO, see ZIEGER, supra
note 1, at 22–24.
40
Pope, supra note 3, at 46.
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lent and criminal—repression at the hands of their employers. This
pattern became particularly pronounced in late 1936, just before the
42
Flint strike erupted. That year, sit-down strikes emerged as a powerful and frequent tactic in the CIO’s struggle to overcome employer
43
resistance in the rubber industry.
The Flint strike is a good example of how the strikes during the
Second New Deal typically played out. In 1936, GM was stridently
committed to what industrial employers had long called the “open44
shop” concept. The term was meant to suggest these employers’
supposed indifference to whether the people who worked for them
belonged to unions, but what it actually meant was that they aggressively opposed attempts by its employees to organize functional, in45
dependent unions. In the mid-1930s, GM enforced its commitment
to the open shop by the liberal use of threats and assaults, espionage,
46
discriminatory discharges, and company unions. A Senate investigation at the time revealed that GM maintained at its plants a full-time
staff of more than 1400 well-armed and well-trained company police,
47
backed by an indeterminate number of part-time police. Moreover,
GM fielded what the committee called an “amazing and terrifying”
48
cadre of labor spies and provocateurs at its more than 100 plants.
49
The company itself employed about 200 spies. Some of these spies
were provided by the more than dozen firms with which GM had con50
tracted to provide espionage services. Along with Chrysler, GM was
the largest client of two of the most prominent labor “detective”
51
agencies, Pinkerton and Corporations Auxiliary. Whether in-house
or contracted, these professional spies coerced and cultivated net52
works of informants—”hooked men’’—who in turn spied as well.
Given these layers, it really cannot be said how many spies GM and its
41
See FINE, supra note 1, at 332 (describing the popularity of sit-down strikes in
areas where unions are weak).
42
Pope, supra note 3, at 55–56.
43
See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 592–600.
44
FINE, supra note 1, at 29.
45
See id. at 22–23.
46
See id. at 29–48; ZIEGER, supra note 1, at 47–49; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 11,
at 516–19.
47
Hearings Before the Comm. on Education and Labor, 75th Cong. 1998–2001 (1937)
[hereinafter LaFollette Committee Hearings].
48
S. REP. NO. 75-46, pt. 3, at 46, 56 (1938)
49
Id. at 23.
50
Id. at 92–93.
51
Id. at 8, 14, 18.
52
Id. at 50.
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sister companies actually used, but the numbers were clearly enormous. So extensive and convoluted was espionage at GM, that the
company found itself in the ridiculous position of spying on its own
53
spies.
This was all done in defiance of the company’s statutory obligations under NIRA and the Wagner Act, and with equal contempt for
54
rulings by the labor boards created under these statutes. By 1936,
the primary target of GM’s anti-unionism was the United Automobile
Workers (UAW), which was rapidly emerging as the main agent of
55
industrial unionism in the automobile industry. In the face of GM’s
resistance, it was impossible for UAW to gain—let alone prove—
56
majority support in the plants. In such a context, strike success
emerged as a prerequisite for organizing success, as rank-and-file
workers, fearing for their jobs and safety, waited for a successful strike
57
to prove that the union—or the law—could actually protect them.
The sit-down strike offered an effective response to this dilemma. Most notably, a successful sit-down strike would check the employer’s ability to continue production with replacement workers and
58
crossovers. A sit-down strike could also be executed with the active
support of only a minority of workers; a few workers at a critical point
59
could shut down an entire factory. The ability to succeed with small
numbers was an important advantage in the face of employer repris60
als. The tactic also allowed strikers to avoid the risks of arrest and
assault by police or company guards, which was often their fate on
61
outdoor picket lines. Furthermore, a sit-down essentially held the
safety of the plant hostage, because it forced the employer to play the
62
role of aggressor if it wanted to end the strike by force. Finally, the
sit-down tactic provided the union an extraordinary forum for cultivating loyalty and solidarity among workers, offering rank-and-file
workers a salient symbol of the union’s ability to confront the em-

53

Id. at 22–23, 46–61.
FINE, supra note 1, at 29–48; ZIEGER, supra note 1, at 47–49.
55
FINE, supra note 1, at 63–99; WALTER GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE TO THE
AFL: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 1935–1941, at 132–34 (1960).
56
See FINE, supra note 1, at 75 (discussing organizational difficulties at the plant).
57
Id. at 98–99; ZIEGER, supra note 1, at 43–45.
58
FINE, supra note 1, at 121.
59
Id. at 122.
60
Id. at 121.
61
Id. Companies were skeptical of using force inside their plants due to the risk
of damage to machinery and other property. Id.
62
Id.
54
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ployer, as well as numerous occasions for the actual practice of mu63
tual support.
Even before the First New Deal, automobile workers began to
64
challenge the open shop aggressively. In the summer of 1930, a
Communist union with a titular presence in many of the plants led a
strike at Fisher Body, a GM subsidiary in Flint, Michigan—one of the
65
plants that would host the great sit-down strike a few years later. After a few days, the strike was smashed by police who broke up pickets
66
and arrested dozens of strikers. The company and its allies followed
67
this up with a torrent of anti-radical propaganda. In March 1932,
twenty-three workers and their supporters were shot, with as many as
four killed, by police and company guards at a protest against hunger
and unemployment at the main gate of Ford’s River Rouge megap68
lant in Dearborn, Michigan.
Although battles such as these failed to end the open shop, they
were witness to a powerful undercurrent of conflict and anger among
the industry’s workers, as well as organizers and activists determined
to force the issue. The enactment of section 7(a) of the NIRA amplified this current. A major strike erupted in 1933 at Ford suppliers
69
Briggs Manufacturing and Murray. In 1934, a strike that began at
Fisher Body in Cleveland spread to several other GM plants; however,
70
little came of it. Later that same year, a strike at Electric Auto-Lite, a
parts producer in Toledo, ended in a sustained battle between workers and 1350 National Guardsmen that left two protesters shot dead
71
and a score on both sides injured.
The Flint sit-down strike arose amidst increasing use of the tactic
in nearby areas, including Detroit, and at other GM facilities nation72
wide. In the lead-up to the strike, emboldened UAW organizers
63
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“harass[ed] supervisors,” orchestrated numerous quickie strikes, and
increased membership “tenfold,” signing up some 3000 members in
73
December 1936 alone. The immediate triggers of the Flint strike
were the company’s discriminatory discipline and discharge of a
number of workers, its continuing refusal to engage the UAW in
meaningful collective bargaining, and a rumor that the company was
about to preempt the strike by removing critical machinery to anoth74
er facility.
On the surface, the union’s focus on Flint might have seemed
foolish because the city’s economy was largely dominated by GM. On
the other hand, the union had great success organizing workers in
Flint, and not by accident: workers in Flint endured a particularly
grim tradition of arbitrary disciplinary tactics and repression of basic
75
labor rights. Moreover, Flint was the closest thing to a central hub
in GM’s far-flung production network and a successful strike there
76
could be especially advantageous. All of these factors prompted the
events in the early winter of 1936. On December 30, 1936, in a move
that was outlined by the union’s leaders but executed spontaneously,
77
UAW workers seized Fisher Body Plants Nos. 1 and 2.
The takeover was dramatic, but it unfolded smoothly and quickly. The strikers quickly ejected foremen and managers, secured the
sprawling facilities against outside invasion, and set about devising
78
accommodations. The strikers would hold the factories until Febru79
ary 11, 1936―an extraordinary forty-four days. During this time
they repelled a major assault by the police—an affray known as the
“Battle of the Running Bulls”—and defied two court injunctions or80
dering them to leave. Weeks into the stand-off, the strikers also improved their position by seizing another plant in GM’s Flint complex,
81
which produced vital engine assemblies. From the outset, the strikers managed to establish in their ranks a degree of order and discip82
line that impressed even their adversaries. The logistics involved in
73
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keeping the plants continuously manned and defended by hundreds
of workers were impressive enough. As the union had hoped, the
shortages created by the strike bottle-necked production and crippled GM; the strike spread to fifteen GM facilities in other parts of
83
the country, eventually idling 136,000 production workers.
As the strike wore on, GM found itself boxed in by its inability to
act and could not convince Michigan Governor Frank Murphy to
storm the Flint factories with the National Guard, President Roosevelt
to intervene with the CIO leadership, or the strikers to emerge with84
out a settlement in place. Just as critically, the strike accomplished
its goal by totally neutralizing GM’s impressive means of labor repres85
sion. Indeed, the strikers’ ability to flout those means tended to fur86
ther enhance their reputation. Moreover, by succeeding with such
an audacious strategy, the strikers were not only able to influence GM
directly, but as the strike’s rapid spread to other plants revealed, they
also communicated to other GM workers the possibility of overcoming the company’s strident, seemingly inviolable opposition to labor
rights. Under mounting political and economic pressure, GM was
forced to yield to a preliminary agreement that provided for the
company’s eventual recognition of the union as the exclusive agent
87
of the company’s industrial workforce.
C. Sit-Down Strikes and the Construction of Modern Labor Relations
Perhaps the most important effect of the Flint strike was what it
communicated to industrial workers across the country. The strike
88
was front-page news nationwide. Workers who followed the strike’s
course could not fail to draw from it the remarkable conclusion that,
if properly led and supported, a union could wrest recognition and
bargaining concessions from even the most powerful anti-union em89
ployers.
Autoworkers in particular responded with a new confidence in industrial unions and in the sit-down tactic. In the weeks

83
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immediately following the end of the Flint strike, the UAW conducted at least eighteen sit-down strikes at other GM facilities before
the company and the union finally agreed to a company-wide con90
tract in mid-March 1937. In March, about 6000 UAW members occupied Chrysler’s Detroit plants. Following a tense standoff that
lasted into April, the company settled with the union, agreeing to the
union’s partial (“members only”) representation of the company’s
91
100,000 employees. During the same period, the UAW successfully
organized a number of smaller automakers, some by sit-down strikes.
As a result, overall dues-paying membership in the UAW increased
92
from 88,000 in February 1937 to 400,000 in October of that year. By
that time, of the major automobile manufacturers, only Ford re93
mained unorganized. Against the backdrop of years of bitter failure
in the face of vicious opposition, the union’s success in these few
months was nothing short of phenomenal.
The impact of the strikes extended well beyond the automobile
industry. “Within days of the settlement of the General Motors
strike . . . the sit down technique literally spread from coast to
94
While 1936 saw only a couple of dozen sit-down strikes,
coast.”
there were 477 that lasted at least one day in 1937, a figure that
95
represented one in ten major strikes that year.
In March 1937,
“[t]he sit-down movement reached its all-time high . . . when 170
96
such strikes involved 167,210 workers.” Just as remarkably, sit-down
strikes that year involved more than 100,000 active participants and
97
idled 400,000. And they were not confined to any particular industry. As labor historian Sidney Fine notes, “The sit-downs involved
every conceivable type of worker—kitchen and laundry workers in the
Israel-Zion Hospital in Brooklyn, pencil makers, janitors, dog catchers, newspaper pressmen, sailors, tobacco workers, Woolworth girls,
rug weavers, hotel and restaurant employees, pie bakers, watchmak90
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ers, garbage collectors, Western Union messengers, opticians, and
98
lumbermen.” As Fine also points out, the large majority of sit-down
strikes in this period continued to be CIO-led and were aimed at
overcoming industrial employers’ entrenched resistance to union organizing. Over 80 percent were successful or partly successful despite
the fact that they tended to occur in industries with strong histories
99
of employer anti-unionism and correspondingly weak unions.
One industry where the sit-down strike proved especially significant was maritime shipping. Seamen were no strangers to sit-down
100
strikes, arguably having originated the tactic. But in 1936 and 1937,
they resorted to the strikes as never before, undertaking probably
hundreds of individual shipboard strikes against shipping companies
101
staunchly opposed to independent union representation.
By the
middle of 1936—well before the UAW occupied GM’s factories—the
situation had reached, in the words of one media account, a “guerilla
102
war at sea.” In March 1936, almost 400 members of the crew of the
passenger steamer California struck that vessel as it approached San
Francisco to protest the company’s wage policies, persecution of union supporters, and foot-dragging in the negotiation of a new con103
tract.
The strikers remained aboard, preventing the vessel from
completing its voyage and preventing its owner, Panama Pacific
Lines, from simply dumping them in that distant port and hiring a
scab crew.
Within days, the affair had become a major crisis, with the strikers’ impromptu leader, a crewman named Joe Curran (who would
later become a national labor leader), negotiating with Secretary of
Labor Frances Perkins, who in turn negotiated with the company and
104
with Roosevelt and other members of his cabinet. Perkins brokered
a settlement that ended the strike, but the settlement proved meaningless after Curran and the other strikers were fired and blacklisted
105
when the ship returned to its home port of New York.
But in the
long run, the California strike inspired a veritable onslaught of shipboard sit-down strikes, led by Curran and other dissidents over the
98
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objections of the moribund and company-dominated union that no106
minally represented them. By late 1936, their efforts had led to the
formation of an independent CIO union, the National Maritime Union (NMU). On the strength of its militant tactics, by the late spring
of 1937, the NMU had become the dominant sailor’s union on the
107
East Coast and Great Lakes.
Sit-down strikes tipped the balance in other industries as well, as
they inspired workers to take bold action and employers to fear the
ultimate consequences of continuing to so vigorously oppose organiz108
ing efforts. A revealing example of this is the influence of sit-down
strikes in the steel industry. In March 1937, the CIO’s success against
GM helped its Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) win
recognition from another industrial colossus, U.S. Steel; although
won without direct resort to the sit-down strike, the agreement drew
substantial benefit from the tactic, as the union’s victory over GM impressed U.S. Steel’s leadership considerably with the risks of contin109
ued resistance. U.S. Steel’s decision is especially notable considering “Big Steel’s” opposition to union representation had been no less
complete than GM’s.
SWOC followed this victory over Big Steel with one over another
large steel producer: Jones & Laughlin. Jones & Laughlin’s violent
anti-unionism had lead to numerous unfair labor practices charges
before the NLRB, making the company the lead party in the land110
In May 1937,
mark Supreme Court case decided that spring.
SWOC staged a massive and tumultuous strike at Jones & Laughlin’s
111
The Aliquippa
mills in Pittsburgh and Aliquippa, Pennsylvania.
strike was particularly audacious because the town was largely owned
112
and controlled by the company. For its record of labor repression,
113
the town was dubbed “Little Siberia” in labor circles. Dramatically
inverting the usual sit-down tactic, the strikers virtually encircled the
Aliquippa mill in a massive cordon, sealed off its gates, attacked cros-

106
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sovers, fought police, and forced a costly two-day closure.
During
the strike, the company agreed to an election, which SWOC won.
The company ultimately recognized the union and signed a contract
that was even more favorable than the agreement SWOC entered into
115
with U.S. Steel.
The sit-down strikes had a different impact on SWOC’s battle for
recognition at other large independent steel producers, the so-called
“Little Steel” companies, which had declined to follow U.S. Steel’s
116
This group included Republic Steel, Bethleshift in labor policy.
hem Steel, Youngstown Sheet & Tube, American Rolling Mills, Na117
tional Steel and Inland Steel.
Under the leadership of Republic
Steel, the companies savagely—and, for a time, successfully—resisted
SWOC’s effort to organize their workers long after the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Wagner Act in Jones &
118
Laughlin.
In the summer of 1937, police, scabs, company guards
and National Guardsmen killed at least sixteen (possibly eighteen)
strikers and supporters in worker protests in the southern Great
119
Lakes region.
A measure of these employers’ hostility emerged
when the Board attempted to enforce the law against Republic Steel.
The Board’s prosecution of unfair labor practice charges brought to
light an extraordinary array of outrageous anti-union practices, including espionage, bribery and corruption of law enforcement, and
120
Congressional investigations
having strikers beaten up and shot.
121
revealed quite a few more examples of such conduct.
Although these and other practices initially discouraged efforts
to organize these companies’ workers by direct action, Republic Steel
and other Little Steel companies eventually accepted the authority of

114
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122

the Wagner Act.
SWOC filed scores of unfair labor practice complaints against the companies for discrimination, intimidation and
coercion, unlawful discharges, espionage, and similar charges, which,
in the wake of Jones & Laughlin, the Board was able to prosecute and
123
enforce despite inevitable company appeals.
The case against Republic Steel alone resulted in an order to reinstate some 7000 em124
ployees.
At the same time, however, the Little Steel strike would,
like the sit-down strikes, play an important role in framing the counter-attack on labor rights that would culminate in the Taft-Hartley
Act.
The Little Steel companies’ trajectory from initial contempt for
labor rights to eventual acquiescence was actually quite typical among
American businesses right up to and beyond the time of the sit-down
125
strikes. As Karl Klare notes, employer hostility to the Wagner Act in
the 1930s was characterized by the expenditure of “vast resources in
systematic and typically unlawful antiunion campaigns involving such
tactics as company unionism, propaganda, espionage, surveillance,
weapons stockpiling, lockouts, pooling agreements for the supply of
126
strikebreakers, and terrorism.”
In the first few years after the statute was passed even Board personnel struggling to enforce the law
against these firms labored under threats of physical assault and legal
persecution at the hands of hostile local officials and company
127
guards.
As has been shown, some employers’ hostility was overcome by
the sit-down strikes themselves. But even among those employers
that were not brought around by direct action, opposition to the
Wagner Act ultimately rested on the assumption that the law was—
and would soon be found by the Supreme Court to be—
128
unconstitutional.
When the statute unexpectedly cleared this hurdle, these employers often yielded to the law’s mandates—at least
129
once they were ordered to do so by the Board. And if they did not
do so immediately, they did so eventually, like the Little Steel compa-
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130

nies, when their appeals were exhausted.
This, along with the requirement that such companies recognize labor rights as a condition
of participating in an expanding war economy, allowed labor to rely
on the NLRB’s unfair labor practice prosecutions and Boardsponsored elections to achieve basic organizing and collective bargaining goals that only a few years earlier seemed utterly out of reach.
131
And the agency’s handling of both types of cases rose dramatically.
The initial result from this process of forging labor rights in basic industries was a huge increase in the CIO’s membership rolls as
132
well as its political and economic clout. It quickly emerged as a powerful rival to the more conservative, craft-oriented, and less militant
133
AFL. Continued aggressive organizing under an increasingly effective regime of labor rights would eventually combine with the resounding economic recovery brought about by the Second World
War to yield truly spectacular advances in both membership and the
134
prevalence of collective bargaining. These developments would in
turn help drive unprecedented increases in wages and economic security for the industrial working class, laying the foundation of an
135
unparalleled period of post-War middle-class prosperity.
To be
sure, prosperity and security would come with a price—reflected in
increasing disenchantment and de-politicization of the working
136
class.
Moreover, the process by which these changes came about
was a gradual one that had to overcome continuing hostility to the
137
Eventually, the
law and the NLRB’s authority among employers.
AFL would recapture the initiative from the CIO and, as will be
shown, the law would become an important obstacle for militant un138
ionism.
But in the meantime, the gains won during this period
would provide the demographic and institutional foundation of a

130
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kind of golden age of industrial unionism that would define the political economy of twentieth-century America.
It is important not to attribute such gains simply to the validation of the Act and the emergence of the NLRB out of the shadow of
unconstitutionality, for the Wagner Act and the NLRB did not merely
replace sit-down strikes and other forms of direct action as the preferred mode of effective labor activism. Rather, these institutions inherited and transformed the rights that workers had earned for
themselves through direct action. As the forgoing review of the
strikes makes abundantly clear, a number of powerful, industryleading manufacturing companies like GM and U.S. Steel abandoned
their virulently anti-union programs and yielded to the mandates of
139
the Act because of the sit-down strikes. It does not suffice to suggest
that these or any other anti-union employers would simply have
changed their position once the Supreme Court upheld the Act; were
it not for the sit-down strikes, it is doubtful that the Act would have
been upheld as constitutional.
As James Pope demonstrates, labor regarded the Supreme
Court’s decision in Schechter Poultry to invalidate the NIRA (including
section 7(a)) as a challenge to the very concept of progressive economic reform that left the constitutionality of its successor, the
140
Wagner Act, very much in doubt. In this light, as Pope puts it, the
sit-down strike “became a form of constitutional politics,” a means by
which workers sought to realize the rights that employers—as well as
141
the Supreme Court—denied them. Remarkably, those who led and
142
After the
participated in the strikes understood them as such.
143
Court upheld the Wagner Act in Jones & Laughlin Steel (and its sev144
eral companion cases ), workers reacted in the same fashion: construing the judicial victory as legal validation of a victory already won
145
in factories and mills across the land.
By this account, the sit-down strikes forced the Court’s hand. If
the Court had invalidated the Wagner Act amidst all these militant

139
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assertions of basic labor rights against defiant employers, CIO unionists and other labor militants would likely have responded by sustaining—perhaps even amplifying—their campaign of sit-downs. Such a
scenario would not only have exposed the Court’s impotence but
would have also implicated the Court in causing the rising tide of so146
cial unrest, especially when two additional factors are considered.
First, President Roosevelt, who was then threatening to “pack” the
Court with New Deal supporters, had shown little inclination to end
147
the strikes by force. Second, local and state officials had also proven, by and large, either equally disinclined to intervene or simply un148
able to do so successfully.
In this context, upholding the Act
149
emerged as a decidedly more attractive option.
For Klare, the very meaning of the Wagner Act remained in
doubt for months after its passage. The business community not only
attempted to defeat the Act, but there were competing visions among
those who supported it regarding how exactly the Act would govern
150
labor relations.
Many of the Wagner Act’s New Deal supporters
were deeply ambivalent about its overall program and may have sacrificed some or all of its legal protections of labor rights to some other
151
interests. Until this contest was settled there was, as the history of
the strikes shows, no real labor law. Klare also stresses that the
process of forging the Act’s meaning was accomplished not only by
the courts, the Board, and other elite institutions, but by labor it-

146
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self—and, in this respect, not only by the movement’s top leaders,
152
The central
but by rank-and-file workers and shop-floor activists.
means by which labor managed to participate in this process was the
sit-down strike, which presented the prospect of disorder and embodied an alternative vision of labor rights, thereby influencing the
153
Court’s ultimate decision to uphold the Wagner Act. Pope explores
this last theme at great length in an article that confronts the claim
earnestly advanced by many sit-down strikers that, as workers, they enjoyed a limited property right in a workplace that embraced their
154
right to strike there.
For both Klare and Pope, a great deal was lost in the Court’s
translation of labor rights won on picket lines and shop floors into
155
formal, legal rights.
Pope is particularly keen to emphasize the
consequences of the Court’s (and Congress’s) reliance on the Com156
merce Clause to ground the constitutionality of the Wagner Act.
For this orientation, he presents an alternative justification that was
157
advanced by organized labor based on the Thirteenth Amendment,
which would have incorporated the labor law into a vibrant culture of
industrial democracy and freedom far better than the Court’s approach did. The Commerce Clause approach anticipated a bureaucratized program of industrial relations oriented to labor peace, but
was conspicuously antithetical to these very things. It may therefore
be seen as a betrayal of the very tradition of solidarity, activism, and
struggle that brought about a system of meaningful labor rights in the
158
first place. Klare likewise emphasizes that the Court’s approach in
Jones & Laughlin and its companion cases was not anti-labor in its
conception so much as it was in its failure to conceptualize the Act as
159
a decisive departure from conventional liberal jurisprudence.
For
Klare, this paved the way for the development of a regime of labor
rights that was fatally rooted in reactionary notions of contract, pri160
vate property, and authority.

152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

See Klare, supra note 2, at 266.
Pope, supra note 3, at 83–84.
Id. at 47–48.
See Klare, supra note 2, at 268–70; Pope, supra note 3, at 107–11.
Pope, supra note 2, at 6–8.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. passim.
Klare, supra note 2, at 298–300, 311–12.
Id. at 311–12.
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III. AND A FOUNDATION OF REACTION: THE SIT-DOWN STRIKES AND
THE ASSAULT ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, 1937–47
While the sit-down strikes proved to be essential to the development of a functional system of labor rights, they also inspired reactionary responses from courts and politicians. These responses would
eventually coalesce in an equally dramatic counterattack against the
sit-down strikes, which would lay the foundation for an ever broader
challenge to labor rights and the right to strike in particular. This
Part traces the first part of this development as it played out from
1937 through 1947—from the Supreme Court’s decisive rulings
against sit-down strikes in Fansteel and Southern Steamship, to the initial
impact of these cases on the administration of the labor law, and finally to the important role the strikes played in framing the radically
anti-labor agenda of the Taft-Hartley Act.
A. The Supreme Court and the Sit-Down Strikes
Until 1939, most sit-down strikes were resolved between workers
and employers at the point of action. Many of the strikes ended in
victory for the strikers, some were abandoned, and a few ended with
the forcible eviction of the strikers by local police and company
161
forces.
Seldom were the courts or the Board much involved. On
quite a few occasions, courts issued injunctions against sit-down strik162
ers, but these were rarely effective. Similarly, although a number of
strikers, including leaders at Flint, were charged with crimes, the authorities usually dropped the charges sometime after the strikes
163
ended.
As Pope makes clear, all of this left the legal status of the
164
strikes unclear for a time.
The Court’s decision in Jones & Laughlin presented an opportunity to erase this ambiguity. If the statute was constitutional and the
Board’s authority legitimate, then workers could no longer justify the
sit-downs as extreme responses to extreme circumstances. Perhaps
more importantly, after Jones & Laughlin, the courts could act against
the sit-down strikers without it appearing as a one-sided attack on labor. In fact, the sit-down strikes by their very nature posed a funda-

161

See Pope, supra note 3, at 84–91.
For example, the Chrysler sit-down strikers were ordered to evacuate by a circuit court judge, but the injunction could not possibly be enforced by the sheriff.
CHARLES K. HYDE, RIDING THE ROLLER COASTER: A HISTORY OF THE CHRYSLER
CORPORATION 116 (2003).
163
FINE, supra note 1, at 318.
164
See Pope, supra note 3, at 62.
162
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mental question: how far did the Wagner Act impinge employers’
traditional property rights and workplace prerogatives? Ironically,
because Jones & Laughlin upheld the Act, it left the courts free to decide this question.
Notwithstanding Jones & Laughlin’s overall effect in increasing
compliance with the Wagner Act, quite a few employers continued to
165
flout the Act and the Board. This intransigence inspired workers to
continue to resort to sit-down strikes to force employers to comply
with the law; such were the circumstances of both Fansteel and Southern Steamship, with the notable difference that the Fansteel strike
(though not the litigation) occurred before Jones & Laughlin and the
166
In both cases it was
Southern Steamship strike occurred afterwards.
Jones & Laughlin’s validation of the Act that cleared the way for the
Supreme Court to rule on the legality of the strikes. And in both cas167
es, the Court declared the sit-down strikes fundamentally unlawful.
In so doing, the Court subordinated the Wagner Act to a degree of
conservative ideology of property and authority that negated the progressive potential of both the Wagner Act and the New Deal. This is a
critique that Klare and others have levied effectively against the sit168
down strike cases.
Not so well established, however, is how the
Court’s decisions in Fansteel and Southern Steamship facilitated attacks
on the right to strike that would extend to tactics that bore little resemblance to the original sit-down strikes.
1.

NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. and Its Aftermath

The dispute that led to Fansteel began in the summer of 1936,
when SWOC undertook to organize Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, a relatively small manufacturer and distributor of rare metals
169
and alloys located in North Chicago, Illinois. In September of that
year, Lodge 66 of the union that hosted SWOC’s organizing efforts,
the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of
165

See GROSS, supra note 110, at 6–8 (discussing the employers’ persistent refusal
to follow the law after Jones & Laughlin).
166
See S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB (Southern Steamship), 316 U.S. 31, 33 (1942) (noting that
the strike occurred in July 1938); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240,
247 (1939) (noting that the strike occurred in February 1937). The Supreme Court
decided NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin on April 12, 1937. 301 U.S. 1, 1.
167
Southern Steamship, 316 U.S. at 46; Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 256.
168
See, e.g., Klare, supra note 2, at 321, 324–25.
169
In re Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 932 (1938), enforcement denied, Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1938), aff’d as modified, 306 U.S. 240 (1939); Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner at 1863, 1867–
68, 1871, Fansteel, 306 U.S. 240 (No. 436).
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North America-CIO, approached Fansteel with a request for recogni170
tion and bargaining.
Fansteel rejected the union’s request and
over the next several months proceeded to violate the statute in a
range of ways designed to destroy the union: Fansteel proposed and
eventually formed a company union; it refused to bargain with any
“outside” union representative; it reassigned Lodge 66’s president to
isolate him from rank-and-file workers; it hired a labor spy to infiltrate the union; and it repeatedly refused to recognize or bargain
171
with the union.
On February 17, 1937, the union, which by that
time commanded a large majority of support, again requested that
172
173
Fansteel submit to bargaining. Again, the company refused. The
plant superintendent, A.J. Anselm, justified the company’s refusal by
questioning the constitutionality of the Wagner Act and surmising
174
that the Supreme Court would hold it unconstitutional.
Shortly
thereafter, the union “held a meeting and decided to hold the plant
as a protest against [Fansteel’s] refusal to enter into collective bar175
gaining.”
That afternoon, ninety-five or so members of the union
then at work seized two buildings at the plant that housed critical
176
production facilities.
The seizure, which immediately shut down Fansteel’s produc177
tion, was accomplished peacefully.
All supervisors, female em178
ployees, and workers opposed to the strike were permitted to leave.
That evening, the plant superintendent, accompanied by two police
officers and company counsel, approached the buildings and demanded that the strikers leave; when they refused, the lawyer in179
formed them that they were fired. The next day, Fansteel secured
170

Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1868–69.
In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 939–43; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner,
supra note 169, at 1870–80.
172
As the Board determined, while the union probably could not demonstrate
majority support when it first demanded recognition in September 1936, it could
demonstrate majority support by a wide margin by February 1937. In re Fansteel, 5
N.L.R.B. at 940; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1878.
173
Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1878–79.
174
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1938), aff’d as
modified, 306 U.S. 240.
175
Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1880.
176
In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 942 (asserting that there were ninety-five strikers in
the building); Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1886
(placing the number of strikers at ninety-four).
177
Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1880.
178
See id.
179
In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 942; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1880.
171
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an injunction from the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois, and a
writ of attachment (for arrest of the strikers), which were read to the
180
strikers that same day.
The strikers still refused to evacuate the
181
plant. The following morning, February 19, “a large force of deputy sheriffs [about 100] attacked the building in an effort to dislodge
the workers. They used gas bombs, clubs and a battering ram but
were repulsed by the employees,” who threw missiles and acid down
182
at the police.
Receiving supplies from co-workers, the strikers continued to oc183
cupy the buildings for another week. In the meantime, Fansteel rejected efforts by the U.S. Department of Labor and the Governor of
184
Illinois to mediate the standoff. On February 26, the company instigated an effort by a larger force of deputies to recapture the build185
ing.
By attacking in the early hours with more powerful weapons,
the deputies were eventually able to gain control of the buildings and
arrest most of the strikers (a few apparently made off in the chaos),
186
although only after a “pitched battle.”
As the Board confirmed, the strikers abstained from any malicious destruction of Fansteel’s property during the strike; in fact, like
other sit-down strikers, they even attempted to protect sensitive ma187
chinery while they held the buildings. Nevertheless, fighting during
the two attempts by police to retake the buildings, as well as the failure of the heating systems (for which the company was likely responsible), caused a fair amount of damage to the buildings and their
188
contents.
Some four months after the strike, thirty-seven of the
men who had participated in the strike were tried and convicted of
180

In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 942; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1880.
181
Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1880.
182
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1938), aff’d as
modified, 306 U.S. 240 (1939); Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note
169, at 1880.
183
In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 942–43; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner,
supra note 169, at 1880.
184
In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 943.
185
Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1880.
186
In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 943; see also Launch Attack on Sitters: Gas Squadron Raids Plant at North Chicago, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 26, 1937, at 1.
187
See In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 942 (stating that the strikers “kept the machines
oiled as best they could”).
188
Id. at 942–43; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at
1880. Fansteel later claimed that damages exceeded $60,000. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 378–79 (7th Cir. 1938), aff’d as modified, 306 U.S. 240
(1939).
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criminal contempt before the Lake County Circuit Court that had enjoined the strike; twenty-four strikers were fined $100 and sentenced
to ten days in jail, eleven were fined $150 and sentenced to 120 days
189
in jail, and two were fined $300 and sentenced to 180 days in jail.
The court reserved the most severe punishment for two union organizers who were not employees of the company: Oakley Mills was
fined $500 and sentenced to 180 days in jail and Meyer Adelman,
who had been organizing at Fansteel since the previous summer and
coordinated the strike, was fined $1000 and sentenced to 240 days in
190
191
jail. All of these men would serve out their sentences.
It was actually Adelman who, on behalf of Lodge 66, filed unfair
labor practice charges against Fansteel. The initial unfair labor practices charges against Fansteel, which related entirely to the company’s
refusal to recognize and bargain with the union, were filed in Sep192
On May 21, 1937, Adelman filed amended charges,
tember 1936.
193
which pressed a number of other issues. Some of these issues concerned Fansteel’s conduct before and during the sit-down strike,
194
while others related to its post-strike treatment of the workers.
In
the meantime, the union continued a conventional strike against
Fansteel, punctuated by several other unsuccessful attempts to get the
195
company to recognize and bargain with the union.
For its part,
Fansteel resumed operations after the sit-down strike with crossovers
and replacement workers. Moreover, in April 1937, it finally constituted a full-fledged company union, the Rare Metal Workers of Amer196
ica, Local 1.
On May 26, 1937, the regional director of the NLRB issued a
formal complaint charging Fansteel with numerous violations of the
Act, including unlawfully refusing to recognize and bargain with

189
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. Lodge 66 of the Amalgamated Ass’n of Steel,
Iron & Tin Workers, 14 N.E.2d 991, 993 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938).
190
Fansteel, 14 N.E.2d at 993. The NLRB’s opinion in the case misstates the number of strikers jailed, describing “most” as being so punished. In re Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 943 (1938), enforcement denied, Fansteel, 98 F.2d 375,
aff’d as modified, 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
191
3 in Fansteel Sitdown Strike End Jail Terms, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 5, 1939, at 13.
192
Charge Before the NLRB at 23, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S.
240 (1939) (No. 436).
193
Amended Charge Before the NLRB at 32, Fansteel, 306 U.S. 240 (No. 436).
194
Id. at 32–33.
195
See In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 943–44 (1938); Intermediate Report of the Trial
Examiner, supra note 169, at 1882.
196
See In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 946–47; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1882, 1897–900.
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Lodge 66, committing espionage against the union, sequestering the
union president and forbidding him to speak to other workers, attempting to dominate Lodge 66, forming a company union, discharging the sit-down strikers and several who aided them “for the reason
of their membership in the union and that they engaged in concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining and for other
mutual aid and protection,” and later rehiring some of the strikers
and their supporters on a discriminatory basis premised on their wil197
lingness to renounce the union or their rights under the statute.
Fansteel denied all of these accusations, stressing that its discharges
of the sit-down strikers were justified by the illegal and violent nature
198
of the strike.
In September 1937, the trial examiner assigned to the case released his ruling in the form of an Intermediate Report. Based on
testimony from 116 witnesses and numerous documents, the report
came only after the trial examiner overcame several dilatory tactics by
Fansteel, including an attempt to enjoin the proceedings on the
ground that the matter was then pending before the Illinois Circuit
199
Court in the form of the criminal contempt proceedings.
The report methodically confirmed every unfair labor practice lodged
200
against Fansteel by the regional director. The report directed that
Fansteel recognize and bargain with Lodge 66, cease and desist from
its efforts to form a company union, and offer reinstatement and
back-pay to all but a handful of employees whose discharge the trial
201
examiner considered justified by reasons not related to the strike.
On the key question of how to deal with the sit-down strikers, the trial
examiner rejected Fansteel’s reference to the strike as justification for
discharging the strikers, noting, first, that the strike had been provoked by Fansteel and, second, that any claim that strike participation
gave Fansteel cause to discharge the strikers was negated by the fact
that the company either reinstated or offered reinstatement to scores
of strike participants—in each case with the implicit condition that
202
they abandon the strike and renounce the union.
Both Fansteel and the union appealed the trial examiner’s ruling to the Board. While the union’s exceptions were minor, Fans-

197
198
199
200
201
202

Complaint at 31, Fansteel, 306 U.S. 240 (No. 436).
Answer at 73, Fansteel, 306 U.S. 240 (No. 436).
Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1865–66.
See id. at 1900–02 (summarizing the trial examiner’s conclusions).
Id. at 1902–05.
Id. at 1882–96.
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203

teel’s were “voluminous.”
With one important exception, the
Board upheld all of the trial examiner’s determinations. The Board
rejected the trial examiner’s conclusion that the discharges of the sitdown strikers and the company’s refusal to offer them unconditional
reinstatement were, in themselves, violations of the anti204
discrimination provision of the Wagner Act.
In the Board’s view,
the sit-down strikers were never actually discharged during or after
205
the strike.
Moreover, while most of the strikers remained off the
job, this was not because they had been discharged or denied reins206
Altatement; rather, it was because they were still out on strike.
though the Board considered it likely that Fansteel would have denied reinstatement to the strikers had they applied “in a body,” this
had not yet occurred and therefore could not be the basis of a claim
207
of unlawful discrimination.
The Board agreed with the trial examiner that the pattern of unfair labor practices warranted a remedy that would “restore as fully as
possible the situation that existed prior to the respondent’s unlawful
208
conduct.”
This meant, among other things, the collective reinstatement of the strikers. That they had engaged in the sit-down strike
was no defense for Fansteel, the Board held, for two reasons. First,
the Board emphasized that Fansteel “does not come before the Board
with clean hands” because its “gross violations of the law . . . were the
209
Anticipating an argument it
moving cause” of the sit-down strike.
would make before the Supreme Court, the Board went even further,
suggesting that the statutory duty imposed on employers to recognize
and bargain with a union, which Fansteel systematically flouted, was
conceived precisely to prevent the kind of intense labor conflict that
210
came about in this case.

203

In re Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 932 (1938), enforcement denied, Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375 (1938), aff’d as modified, 306
U.S. 240 (1939).
204
Id. at 944.
205
Id. at 945–46.
206
Id. at 944–45.
207
Id. at 945.
208
Id. at 949.
209
In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 949.
210
See id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937)).
The other major point on which the Board disagreed with the trial examiner was
whether Fansteel was obliged to recognize and bargain with the union in September
1936; the Board found that the union did not present evidence of majority support
at this juncture. Id. at 940.
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Second, the Board confronted the company’s claim that the
criminal nature of the strike deprived it of the power to order the
strikers’ reinstatement, regardless of whether they had been dis211
On this point, the Board’s unwillingness to find
charged or not.
that the strikers had been discharged reveals its significance. If the
strikers had never actually been discharged for their participation in
the sit-down strike, they remained unequivocal employees under the
Act and potential beneficiaries of the Board’s remedial authority—
without the Board having to show that the discharges themselves were
unlawful or engage the unsettled issue of whether a discharge would
212
terminate employee status under the Act. Moreover, this reading of
events forced the company to argue that this strike barred reinstatement as a remedy for other violations of the Act, not simply that it was
adequate grounds to discharge. The Board focused on the issue of
Fansteel’s unclean hands, holding that the company should not escape legal consequences when its own unlawful conduct was so egre213
gious that it provoked an illegal response from its employees.
In
such a circumstance, the Board reasoned, its prerogative to fashion
remedies to advance the aims of the Act clearly trumped Fansteel’s
214
post hoc rationalizations.
The Board went a step further on this issue, stressing that it did not automatically discount strikers’ criminal
behavior in deciding whether to order their reinstatement and citing
several cases involving serious felonies in which it had, in fact, re215
jected that remedy.
The Board’s purpose in mentioning this consideration was to show that it weighed all the equities and found
reinstatement, among other, less controversial remedies, essential to
effectuating the Act.
Fansteel appealed the Board’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Although the court deferred to the
Board’s conclusion about Fansteel’s use of a labor spy and its support
216
for a company union, it overturned the Board on every other issue.
At the center of the court’s reasoning was its unqualified view that sitdown strikes were illegal, that Fansteel discharged the strikers and
their supporters because of this, and that the discharges were there-

211

See id. at 949–50.
See id. at 950.
213
Id. at 949.
214
See id. at 949–50.
215
In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 949–50.
216
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 380–81 (7th Cir. 1938),
aff’d as modified, 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
212
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217

fore justified. Accordingly, Fansteel could have no duty to bargain
with the strikers on that day or any subsequent day, as the discharges
218
left the union without majority support in Fansteel’s workforce.
Moreover, the court held, the discharged workers thereby lost their
status as employees under the Act and were no longer entitled to the
219
rights it conveyed.
Though largely built around arguments for deference to the
220
Board, the dissenting judge’s opinion effectively laid bare the real
policy questions before the court. First, referring to the majority’s
claim that a decision to uphold the Board would constitute “an ap221
proval of the unlawful acts of the employees,” Judge Treanor retorted that “it is as meaningless as would be the contention that a reversal of the order of the Board constitutes an approval of the
[employer’s] unlawful defiance of the National Labor Relations Act
222
[NLRA].” Treanor also noted that while the sit-down strikers may
have been in the wrong, “it is obvious that they did not make a greater mistake as to the law than did the petitioner and its advisors who
believed that the petitioner could rightfully refuse to bargain collectively with the agent of the employees on the ground that the Nation223
al Labor Relations Act was unconstitutional.”
The Supreme Court did not hear arguments in Fansteel until
January 1939 and did not decide the case until February 27 of that
224
year—two years and one day after the police recaptured the plant.
As is normal in the progression of a case from an administrative
agency to the Supreme Court, the Court’s decision distilled both factual and legal questions to a minimal set of issues. In this instance
though, the process served to prejudge the dispute. In the view of
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who wrote the majority opinion,
the case presented only one important question: whether the Board
217

Id. at 380–82.
Id. at 382.
219
Id.
220
The dissenting judge contended simply that the Board’s conclusions regarding
the employer’s violations of the Act were clearly supported by evidence and warranted deference by the court; that the Board was right to consider the strikers to
remain employees under the Act, and thus lawful beneficiaries of its remedial authority; and, finally, that the remedies chosen by the Board were also appropriate
means of effectuating the statute’s policy aims. Id. at 383–89 (Treanor, J., dissenting).
221
Id. at 388.
222
Fansteel, 98 F.2d at 389 (Treanor, J., dissenting).
223
Id.
224
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 240 (1939).
218
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had the authority to order the reinstatement of the sit-down strik225
ers.
For Chief Justice Hughes, the issue was simply a matter of
whether the Board would be allowed to endorse employees’ criminal
behavior at the expense of employers’ property rights and business
prerogatives.
Even more explicitly and tersely than the Court of Appeals,
Chief Justice Hughes deferred to the Board’s findings regarding unfair labor practices that occurred prior to the commencement of the
226
sit-down strike. Turning to the central issue, Chief Justice Hughes
then quickly showed his hand. Noting that the Board had changed
its position on whether the employer’s statements to the strikers constituted a genuine mass discharge, but without engaging the reasons
for the shift, Chief Justice Hughes declared the “discharge was clearly
227
proven.” Moreover, he deemed the discharges thoroughly justified
by the sit-down strike: “[I]t was a high-handed proceeding without
shadow of legal right” that gave “good cause” for the strikers’ dis228
charge unless this was otherwise prevented by the Wagner Act.
On this question, Chief Justice Hughes was equally strident.
While he conceded that Fansteel had violated the labor law, he held
“there is no ground for saying that it made respondent an outlaw or
deprived it of its legal rights to the possession and protection of its
229
property.” In Chief Justice Hughes’ view, this fact gave Fansteel “its
normal rights of redress,” which includes “the right to discharge
230
wrongdoers from its employ.” To the Board’s claim—supported by
the broad wording of the relevant provisions—that the strikers nonetheless remained employees under the Wagner Act and were thereby
entitled to benefit from the Board’s remedial powers, Chief Justice
Hughes said simply that “[w]e are unable to conclude that Congress
intended to compel employers to retain persons in their employ re231
gardless of their unlawful conduct.” Chief Justice Hughes provided
a similar response to the Board’s alternative claim that the provision

225

Id. at 247.
See id. at 251–52.
227
Id. at 252.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 253.
230
Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 254. Hughes did not address directly Judge Treanor’s dissent, which suggested that perhaps the strikers’ “outlaw” status should not automatically disqualify them from the protections of the law. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v.
NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 384 (7th Cir. 1938) (Treanor, J., dissenting), aff’d as modified, 306
U.S. 240 (1939).
231
Id. at 255.
226
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of the statute granting its remedial authority—section 10(c), which
broadly accorded the Board the power to adopt remedies that effectuate the aims of the Act—allowed it to order the strikers’ reinstate232
ment even if they were no longer statutory employees. Purporting
to affirm the Wagner Act’s fundamental purpose in advancing basic
labor rights of self-organization and collective bargaining, Chief Justice Hughes resorted to formalism: “There is not a line in the statute
to warrant the conclusion that it is in any part of the policies of the
Act to encourage employees to resort to force and violence in de233
fiance of the law of the land.”
This brusque, even imperious, rejection of the Board’s case was
reflected even more clearly in the way the Court assessed the employer’s rehiring campaign after the sit-down strike. As the Board saw it,
Fansteel’s practice of conditionally rehiring some of the strikers not
only demonstrated the falsity of the employer’s assertion that it discharged the sit-down strikers (if this occurred at all) because of their
misconduct during that episode, it also constituted another violation
of the statute: an attempt by the employer to condition reemploy234
ment on renunciation of union support and the right to strike.
Chief Justice Hughes dismissed this argument by simply taking for
granted Fansteel’s claim—which had been explicitly refuted by the
regional director, the trial examiner, and the Board—that it only offered reinstatement to employees whom the union had forced to par235
ticipate in the strike. Beyond this, Chief Justice Hughes merely appealed to an employer’s supposedly inherent right to decide whom it
236
employs.
Chief Justice Hughes concluded his opinion by invoking similar
reasoning to deny the Board the power to reinstate those employees
237
who supported the sit-down strikers.
The Court then rejected the
Board’s attempt to order Fansteel to recognize and bargain with Local 66, holding that the valid discharge of the sit-down strikers had
sufficiently changed the union’s circumstances to absolve Fansteel of
238
any such obligation, and noting that the Board could order an elec232

See id. at 257.
Id. at 257–58.
234
See In re Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 944–46 (1938), enforcement denied, Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v NLRB, 98 F.2d 375 (1938), aff’d as modified, 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
235
Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 259.
236
See id.
237
Id. at 259–61.
238
Id. at 261–62.
233
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239

tion instead. Finally, in a meaningless concession to the Board and
the union, Chief Justice Hughes upheld the Board’s determination
that the Rare Metal Workers Union was an unlawful company un240
ion.
Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion was not joined by all of his col241
Justice Reed, joined by Justice Black, disleagues on the Court.
sented on the question of reinstatement, taking the majority to task
for inflexibly construing the “lawlessness” of the sit-down strikers as
242
necessarily determinative of the limits of the Board’s authority. In
Justice Reed’s view, the Wagner Act very clearly charged the Board
with effectuating its goal of industrial peace obtained via a functional
243
In this respect, the Board acted reasonably
system of labor rights.
and appropriately in dealing with a dispute in which both sides “had
244
erred grievously in their respective conduct.” Under such circumstances, Justice Reed concluded, it was simply not appropriate for the
245
Court to second-guess the Board’s solution.
Chief Justice Hughes’s opinion in Fansteel is a resounding reaffirmation of the Court’s adherence to traditional notions of private
property, social order, and workplace authority after the tumult and
uncertainty of the previous years. In Fansteel, Chief Justice Hughes,
who in the preceding years had authored the lead opinions in both
Schechter Poultry and Jones & Laughlin, made clear that the New Deal
did not fundamentally alter the relationship between labor rights and
property rights. Rather, as Pope describes it, Fansteel verified that
“the employer could violate the workers’ statutory rights without sacrificing its property rights, while the workers could not violate the
employer’s property rights without sacrificing their statutory rights—
246
a return to the hierarchy of values that predated the Wagner Act.”
To this it might be added that the decision also subordinated the Act
(and the Board as well) to a comprehensive ideology of order and authority that recognized the right of employers, but not workers, to

239

Id. at 262.
Id. at 262–63.
241
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone concurred with Hughes in all but the Chief Justice’s
narrow reading of the term “employee” and his reliance on this reading to limit the
Board’s remedial authority. Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 263–65 (Stone, J., concurring in
part).
242
Id. at 265–68 (Reed, J., dissenting in part).
243
Id. at 266–67.
244
Id. at 267.
245
See id. at 265–68.
246
Pope, supra note 3, at 106.
240

WHITE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

3/15/2010 12:28 PM

SIT-DOWN STRIKES

37

resort to illegal acts of self help. Similarly, for Klare, Fansteel embodied the restoration of legal formalism in labor law jurisprudence, a
perspective that would secure the elevation of often reactionary legal
doctrines, such as Chief Justice Hughes’s appeal to property rights,
over a view of labor rights focused on the textured realities of labor
247
relations.
By all of these means, Fansteel helped frame a jurisprudence that broadly repudiated the Wagner Act’s more reformist tendencies and, still more broadly, made clear the limits of the New Deal
248
as a whole.
249
In reaction to Fansteel, employers fired hundreds of workers.
They also began to defend themselves against Board reinstatement
orders by arguing that the workers in question had engaged in sit250
down strikes.
In more than a few cases, the Board found itself
251
compelled by the black letter of Fansteel to deny reinstatement.
Nevertheless, under the leadership of Chairman J. Warren Madden,
the Board continued to search for ways to reconcile Fansteel with the
implementation of a meaningful system of labor rights in a climate of
252
vigorous employer opposition.
Accordingly, in quite a number of
cases, the Board rejected the employer’s claim that a sit-down strike
had occurred, finding the claim either pretextual or a circumstance

247

See Klare, supra note 2, at 323–34.
See id. at 325; Pope, supra note 3, at 106.
249
Most notably, two New Jersey companies, Archer Daniels Midland and Mergott,
retroactively fired several hundred employees for their participation in sit-downs. 50
More Lose Jobs on Sit-Down Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1939, at 18.
250
See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 994, 999 (1941); In re United Dredging Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 739, 766–67, 787 (1941); In re Ford Motor Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 873,
914 (1941); In re Cudahy Packing Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 837, 867 (1941); In re Metal Hose
& Tubing Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 1121, 1138 (1940); In re Condenser Corp. of Am., 22
N.L.R.B. 347, 431 (1940).
251
See, e.g., In re Ore S.S. Corp., 29 N.L.R.B. 954, 978 (1941); In re Aladdin Indus.,
Inc., 22 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1220 (1940), enforced as modified, 125 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1942);
In re Berkerman Shoe Corp. of Kutzman, 21 N.L.R.B. 1222, 1237 (1940); In re Reading Batteries, Inc., 19 N.L.R.B. 249, 259 (1940).
252
Madden, a conscientious moderate committed to the vigorous and earnest enforcement of the statute, was apparently shocked by the outrageous conduct so frequently brought to light by Board investigations. GROSS, supra note 110, at 12. The
two other members of the post-Jones & Laughlin Board, Edwin Smith and Donald
Wakefield Smith, both leaned to the left and favored the aggressive enforcement of
the statute. Id. passim. Another important figure in shaping Board policy during this
period was Nathan Witt, a leftist who served as the Board’s secretary from 1937 to
1940. Id. at 13, 110–13, 135–36. The staff and membership of the Board in the late
1930s and early 1940s comprised a politically diverse array of people (including, for
the time, an inordinate number of women professionals); in general, though, even
the relative conservatives were people who believed in the Wagner Act and were
committed to enforcing it vigorously and fairly. Id. passim.
248
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253

outside the definition of Fansteel. In other cases, the Board continued to order reinstatement when the strikers left peacefully when instructed by the police or when the employer rehired some of the
254
strikers in a discriminatory fashion. Nevertheless, this fundamentally realistic approach to the issue did not always receive the approval
of courts, which occasionally declined to enforce reinstatement or255
ders in such cases.
Militant unionists achieved an important victory before the
courts that ran counter to the spirit of Fansteel in late 1939 when the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a Board decision
ordering Republic Steel to reinstate strikers implicated in serious vi256
olence.
In Republic Steel, a case arising out of the 1937 Little Steel
strike, the Board refused to account for allegations of criminality or
257
violence not backed by guilty pleas or convictions.
Stressing the
company’s provocation of the strike and the fact that it was manifestly
“guilty of brutal acts of violence” far more serious than those of the
strikers, the Board ordered the reinstatement of strikers who had
been convicted of crimes of violence, excepting only those convicted
258
of serious felonies. Although it followed other courts and rejected
the Board’s attempts to reinstate some strikers who were guilty of serious misdemeanors, the Third Circuit’s decision upheld the Board’s
259
reinstatement of the other strikers.
While Republic Steel did not involve a sit-down strike, the court’s
decision to uphold the Board seemed to speak directly to the propriety of the contextual approach to sit-down strikes and related
forms of protest that the Board was then trying to articulate in the
253
See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. at 1026–27, 1086–87, 1107; In re United
Dredging Co., 30 N.L.R.B. at 787–90; In re Ford Motor Co., 29 N.L.R.B. at 914; In re Cudahy Packing Co., 29 N.L.R.B. at 868; In re Condenser Corp. of Am., 22 N.L.R.B. at 431; In
re Metal Hose & Tubing Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 1138. On this critical tendency by the
Board, see also NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass’n, 310 U.S. 318, 340–42 (1940)
(upholding Board order of reinstatement against attempt by employer and court of
appeals to invoke Fansteel where this issue not raised before the Board itself).
254
See, e.g., In re Stewart Die Casting Corp., 14 N.L.R.B. 872, 879, 895–97 (1939),
enforced as modified, 114 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1940); In re Universal Film Exch., Inc., 13
N.L.R.B. 484, 489 (1939).
255
See, e.g., McNeely & Price Co. v. NLRB, 106 F.2d 878, 881 (3d Cir. 1939), modifying In re McNeely & Price Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 800 (1938).
256
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479–80 (3d Cir. 1939), modified,
311 U.S. 7 (1940).
257
In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 390–91 (1938), enforced as modified,
107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1939), modified, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
258
Id. at 391.
259
Republic Steel, 107 F.2d at 477–78.
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wake of Fansteel. Ironically, the nature of this relationship between
Republic Steel and the Board’s sit-down strike jurisprudence would be
confirmed in due course, as a broader and more reactionary reading
260
of Fansteel came to govern cases like Republic Steel. As will be seen,
Fansteel’s restrictive reading of labor rights would eventually swallow
Republic Steel.
Although Fansteel contributed to a reduction in the frequency of
sit-down strikes—which by 1939 was already down compared with the
261
preceding two years—the decision did not stop such strikes entirely.
Quickie sit-downs, usually arising as unplanned, wildcat strikes, con262
On quite a few occasions,
tinued to occur for years after Fansteel.
such strikes resembled the signature sit-downs of a few years earlier in
scale, if not duration. In early 1941, for example, CIO members
joined independent unionists and used a sit-down strike to briefly
263
close an International Harvester plant in East Moline, Illinois.
Around the same time, SWOC unionists engaged in sit-downs at Beth264
lehem Steel in Lackawanna, New York, and U.S. Steel in Pitts265
burgh. In April of that year, a twelve hour sit-down strike at Ford’s
enormous River Rouge complex featured in a lengthy and determined campaign by UAW activists to counter the veritable reign of
terror that the company had continued to use to suppress organizing
266
efforts.
These strikes inevitably reflected two often closely related dynamics: first, the conflicts that arose in newly (and often tenuously)
recognized unions trying to establish their legitimacy and functionality; and second, the persistence of a more categorical opposition to
labor rights across the economic landscape. While Jones & Laughlin
portended a significant change in industrial relations and invigorated
the Board’s enforcement efforts, the decision did not convince all

260
Militant labor scored another victory when the Supreme Court, in Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 512–13 (1940), ruled that a sit-down strike did not constitute a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
261
Pope, supra note 3, at 107–11.
262
Id.; James R. Zetka, Jr., Work Organization and Wildcat Strikes in the U.S. Automobile Industry, 1946–1963, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 214, 215 (1992).
263
C.I.O. Union Joins Harvester Strike; Tie-Up May Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1941, at
1; Plant Closed in Harvester Labor Dispute, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 17, 1941, at 29.
264
Bethlehem Union Stirs Plant Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1941, at 7; 300 on Sit Down
Strike in C.I.O. Steel Dispute, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 25, 1941, at 7; 100 Working on Defense
Job Call Sitdown Strike, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 8, 1941, at 3.
265
Workers Return after Sit-Down Strike at Carnegie-Illinois Plant, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,
1941, at 2.
266
Ford Defies CIO Strikers, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 2, 1941, at 1.
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employers to drop their resistance to the legal protection of basic labor rights. Newly unionized firms continued to test the power of unions to translate representation into meaningful gains in compensa267
tion and control over the workplace.
Other companies, including
many that had not yet accepted union representation at all, remained
committed to testing the Board’s ability to enforce the law’s basic tenets, holding out hope that the statute would be amended or that the
Board would, under the pressure of both employer intransigence and
conservative political activism, retreat from the earnest view of labor
268
rights that defined its first few years of existence.
Fansteel actually fueled both modes of employer resistance. It
undermined labor’s ability to resort to the kinds of weapons—the sitdown strikes and related tactics—that had proved so integral to the
realization of meaningful labor rights, and it signaled to the Board’s
269
opponents the Board’s relatively tolerant approach to such tactics.
Ironically, though, employer intransigence inspired continued resort
to the sit-down strike, albeit in a somewhat less frequent and less
270
spectacular fashion than before.
2.

Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB

Southern Steamship emerged out of such continuing conflict. As
mentioned, the maritime transport industry was an important arena
271
of militant labor activism in the late 1930s. As in automobiles, steel,
and other basic industries, the targets of this militancy were employers intent on resisting workers’ claims for basic labor rights notwith272
Like Fansteel, the Southern Steamship
standing the Wagner Act.
Company occupied a small niche in an industry dominated by large
concerns; in the last years of the 1930s, the company operated seven
cargo vessels, all on a regular route between Houston and a home
273
base in Philadelphia. Until the end of 1937, Southern Steamship’s
“unlicensed seamen” were represented by the corrupt and ineffectual
International Seaman’s Union (ISU), which by 1937 was withering in

267

See GROSS, supra note 110, at 13–16.
See id. (discussing some specific examples of this).
269
See id. at 83–84.
270
See, e.g., Threatens Labor Board; Thomas, Auto Union Head, Says Sitdowns May Be
Used, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1941, at 19 (reporting “threat” by president of UAW to revert to sit-down strikes to counter Board’s increasingly conservative approach).
271
See supra text accompanying notes 101–107.
272
See supra text accompanying notes 108–115.
273
In re S. S.S. Co. (Southern Steamship), 23 N.L.R.B. 26, 27 (1940), enforced, 120
F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1941), rev’d, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
268
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the face of an increasingly effective NMU campaign to bring these
274
workers within the CIO fold. In October of that year, the ISU desperately tried to preempt the NMU’s advances by petitioning the
Board to hold elections at Southern Steamship and more than fifty
275
other shipping lines.
The NMU decisively won almost all of these
elections, including the one at Southern Steamship, and in January
1938, it was certified as the bargaining representative for Southern
276
Steamship’s unlicensed personnel.
Following the pattern in basic industries, though, for the better
part of a year after Board certification, Southern Steamship refused
277
in any way to recognize the NMU. The company filed specious objections with the Board contesting the results of the election, but its
main strategy was simply to ignore or refuse every request by the un278
ion to initiate bargaining. Finally, on July 17, 1938, NMU members
of the freighter, City of Fort Worth, met in a Houston union hall with
union officials and agreed to strike that vessel to protest the compa279
ny’s intransigence. The next morning, as the ship was at dock being readied to sail, thirteen seamen gathered on deck and refused to
perform any further duties until the company agreed to bargain with
280
the union.
When the captain read them their shipping articles
(traditional individual contracts for shipboard service), proclaimed
the strike illegal under the terms of these documents, and ordered
them back to work, the strikers responded by pointing out that the
281
law was on their side.
In so doing, the sailors were actually repeat-

274

White, supra note 3, at 315–17.
Id. at 318–19.
276
Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 27; White, supra note 3, at 315, 318–19.
277
Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 30–32.
278
Id.; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner at 703, 705–07, S. S.S. Co. v.
NLRB (Southern Steamship), 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320). Southern Steamship also
refused to give NMU representatives boarding passes, without which they could not
board the company’s vessels on which their members resided. This would be one of
several other grounds for finding the company in violation of the statute. Southern
Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 31.
279
Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 32–33; Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 707–09.
280
The thirteen represented the majority of the nineteen unlicensed seamen on
board. They had originally intended to shut off some of the ship’s systems when they
struck, but evidently dropped this plan. The only affirmative act of protest engaged
in by the strikers occurred at the outset of the strike, when several of them refused to
send steam to the deck machinery used to load cargo. Intermediate Report of the
Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 708–10.
281
Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 33.
275
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ing a contention that sit-down strikers had publically made in other
282
cases, including the big Chrysler strike several years earlier.
The standoff continued peacefully throughout the rest of the
283
day.
By that evening, lawyers for the company and the union
reached a settlement according to which the strikers agreed to
resume their duties and the company agreed to commence collective
284
bargaining and refrain from disciplining the strikers.
The City of
Fort Worth sailed for Philadelphia that night at its usual sailing time
285
and there were no further disruptions during the voyage.
In fact,
the trial examiner described the strikers’ conduct during this passage
286
as “exemplary.” But when the ship made port several days later, the
287
captain fired five of the strikers.
In response, all but one of the
other participants in the original strikes struck the ship in protest—
288
this time in conventional fashion—and were themselves discharged.
The day after the discharges, the NMU filed unfair labor practice charges against Southern Steamship, alleging that the company
violated the Wagner Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with
the union, interfering with the seamen’s rights of self-organization
and collective bargaining, and discharging and refusing to reinstate
289
the strikers. The regional director then filed formal complaints advancing all these charges as violations of NLRA sections 8(1), (3), and
290
(5). Early in 1939, a trial examiner ruled against Southern Steamship on every count and ordered, among other things, the reinstate291
ment of the discharged strikers. On the central issue of the legality
of the strike, the trial examiner had to confront the claim that it was a
sit-down strike and therefore unprotected under Fansteel. In rejecting
this argument, the trial examiner emphasized that the strikers had
not taken possession of the vessel or interfered with its operation:
“[t]hey merely refused to work, and if they did anything with the ves-

282

Russell B. Porteb, Court Orders C.I.O. Strikers to Leave Chrysler Plants; Murphy
Plans Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16 1937, at 1; Union’s Letter to Murphy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1937, at 30.
283
See Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 32–34.
284
Id. at 34.
285
Id. at 34–35; Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 710–11.
286
Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 710–11.
287
Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 35–36; Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 711.
288
Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 35.
289
Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 705, 707.
290
Id. at 703.
291
Id. at 721–23.
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sel it was in the interest of assuring its safety.” Moreover, the trial
examiner refuted the company’s claim that the strike was prohibited
by maritime law, emphasizing that the Wagner Act “does not exempt
maritime employment” and that mutiny law therefore “must be read
together with the provisions of the Act, which preserves the right to
293
strike.” The trial examiner concluded, “This must be especially so
when, as in this case, the strikes had been indubitably precipitated by
294
unfair labor practices.”
Southern Steamship’s claim that the strike constituted a sit-down
295
strike was also central to the Board’s review of the case. Despite the
apparent cogency of the trial examiner’s analysis, the claim could not
be dismissed out of hand. The strike did occur on the property of
the employer and was at least in violation of the strikers’ shipping articles, if not an act of criminal mutiny. For the Board, the differences
between this case and Fansteel were decisive, and the Board unanim296
The
ously upheld the central findings of the trial examiner.
Board’s April 1940 decision noted not only that the alleged sit-down
strike was clearly caused by Southern Steamship’s unlawful conduct,
but also that the strike was peaceful, that it was never in defiance of
an order to leave the ship, and that it never put the ship or its crew in
297
any danger because it took place dockside. Once again adhering to
the analysis of the trial examiner, the Board also pointed out that the
strike could not be a sit-down strike in the sense of involving a trespass to the company’s property because the ship was the strikers’
298
Although the strike contravened the shipping articles, the
home.
Board found that these were, in effect, individual employment contracts that could not lawfully constrain the right to strike consistent
299
with the Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia acts.
In one notable respect, the Board’s decision in this case went
beyond its decision in Fansteel. Here, the Board found that the company discharged some of the strikers solely because of their participa300
tion in the shipboard strike. The Board actually took a more blunt
292

Id. at 714.
Id. at 714–15.
294
Id. at 715.
295
In re S. S.S. Co. (Southern Steamship), 23 N.L.R.B. 26, 28, 36–38 (1940), enforced,
120 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1941), rev’d, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
296
See id. at 28–29.
297
Id. at 37–38.
298
Id. at 38.
299
Id. at 38–39.
300
Id. at 38.
293
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view than the trial examiner, who had taken pains to show that the
company’s discharges were illegal because they evidenced discrimina301
Because the Board viewed the strike as
tion among the strikers.
lawful, and because there were no other valid grounds for discharge,
302
the discharges of the strikers were in themselves violations of law.
The Board upheld virtually all of the remedies ordered by the trial
examiner, including the order that the company reinstate the dis303
charged seamen.
Southern Steamship appealed the Board’s decision to the Third
Circuit. In 1941, an en banc panel of that court found, in a four-to304
At the center of
one vote, in favor of the Board on all key issues.
the opinion was again the basic question of the strike’s legality.
While admitting that the issue was clouded by both Fansteel and the
traditional application of mutiny law to prohibit shipboard strikes,
the court nevertheless refused to declare the strike illegal on either
305
ground.
Fansteel, it noted, involved an outright seizure of the
workplace, violent defiance of the authorities’ attempts to oust the
employees, and criminal contempt of a court order to evacuate the
306
property—all elements absent from this case.
Moreover, while mutiny law clearly prohibited shipboard strikes on a vessel at sea if such
strikes were violent or involved an attempt to take possession of the
ship or interfere with its operation, the law did not seem to apply to
the case at hand because the circumstances were different in all these
307
respects.
In light of this ambiguity, the court reasoned, the labor
law’s protection of basic labor rights—which made no exceptions for
308
shipboard labor—should prevail.
The Supreme Court did not hear arguments in Southern Steam309
ship until February 1942, roughly two months after America’s entry
310
to the Second World War.
At the center of Southern Steamship’s
301
Compare Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 37–38 with Intermediate Report of
Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 714–20.
302
Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 34–43.
303
Id. at 44–45, 47–48; Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at
723–26.
304
S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB (Southern Steamship), 120 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1941), rev’d, 316
U.S. 31 (1942).
305
Id. at 508–11.
306
Id. at 509.
307
Id.
308
Id.
309
S. S.S. & Co. v. NLRB (Southern Steamship), 316 U.S. 31, 31 (1942).
310
Frank L. Kluckhohn, Unity in Congress; Only One Negative Vote as President Calls to
War and Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1941, at 1.
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argument to the Court was the claim that its ship’s officers held an
inviolate authority, codified in the law of mutiny, to control workers
aboard its vessels, and that the strikers illegally flouted this authority
311
while the Board’s decision infringed upon it.
For their part, both
the Board and the NMU were, like the Third Circuit, keen to distinguish the case from Fansteel and to demonstrate that the federal mu312
tiny statute did not apply to circumstances such as these. Likewise,
they stressed that if a strike such as the one in question were deemed
unlawful under the Wagner Act, seamen would essentially lack an ef313
fective right to strike at all. For where could they strike in meaningful fashion if not aboard ship?
The Court’s repudiation of the Board and the union on these
points would be every bit as complete as in Fansteel. Writing for a fivejustice majority, Justice James Byrnes (who as a U.S. Senator pro314
posed anti-sit-down strike legislation ) opened his argument with an
unqualified affirmation of the view that seamen are a dependent class
of workers, forever subject to the authority of their “masters” aboard
315
ship. From this vantage point, it was clear to Justice Byrnes that the
strikers had committed mutiny; by their conduct, the strikers “under316
took to impose their will on the captain and officers.”
As for the
many grounds proffered by the Board and the union to question this
conclusion and distinguish what happened aboard the City of Fort
Worth from the more definite examples of mutiny, Justice Byrnes
317
found these simply unworthy of attention.
Even more ominously for organized labor, Justice Byrnes rejected just as decisively the idea that the Board had any authority to
square the interests and purposes of mutiny law with the Wagner
318
Act.
The Board argued to the Court that, even if the City of Fort
Worth strike could be characterized as a mutiny, it was hardly an egregious case of mutiny, and that in such circumstances the Board retained the authority under the Wagner Act to order the strikers’
319
Justice Byrnes rejected this position categorically.
reinstatement.
While conceding the Board’s discretion to remedy unfair labor prac311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319

Southern Steamship, 316 U.S. at 39–40.
Id. at 40.
See id. at 42–43.
Pope, supra note 3, at 93.
Southern Steamship, 316 U.S. at 38–39.
Id. at 41.
Id. passim.
Id. at 41–48.
Id. at 40.
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tices, Justice Byrnes invoked Fansteel for the notion that “this discre320
tion has its limits, and we have already begun to define them.” The
Board, he continued, simply could not undertake to accommodate
labor rights in a manner that “ignore[d] other and equally important
321
Congressional objectives.”
That he conceived this proscription to
cut in only one direction—to foreclose the enforcement of labor
rights in order to accommodate the century-old mutiny law—was of
no apparent concern to Justice Byrnes. Nor was he moved in any way
by the argument that this position would leave seamen with no meaningful right to strike at all. In Justice Byrnes’ view, such workers had
322
the option to turn to the courts.
Justice Reed authored a brief dissent in Southern Steamship, which
Justice Black, Justice Douglas, and Justice Murphy joined. Reiterating
some of the points made in his Fansteel dissent, Justice Reed’s central
argument in Southern Steamship was that the majority excessively constrained the Board’s remedial authority, leaving in place an “iron rule
that a discharge of a striker by his employer for some particular, unlawful conduct in furtherance of a strike is sufficient to bar his reins323
tatement as a matter of law.” Justice Reed noted, as he had in Fansteel, that this left the Board unable to craft meaningful remedies for
324
The critical
an employer’s flagrant violations of the Wagner Act.
difference in this case, as he pointed out, was that the City of Fort
Worth strike was devoid of the features on which Chief Justice Hughes
relied to make his argument in Fansteel, such as seizure of property,
violence, resistance to the judicial authority and the efforts of law en325
forcement, and criminal prosecution.
Above all else, Southern Steamship constituted an extension of
Fansteel’s anti-strike jurisprudence. This is evident in two principal
ways. First, and perhaps most plainly, Southern Steamship in effect expanded the definition of the sit-down strike to strikes that do not feature outright seizure of property, violence, defiance of legal process,
or actual prosecution. Of course, that case did involve a peculiar legal circumstance (the application of federal mutiny law in the maritime context) and a determination by the Court that the strikers’
putative violation of the mutiny law mandated a limitation of the

320
321
322
323
324
325

Id. at 46.
Southern Steamship, 316 U.S. at 47.
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 51 (Reed, J., dissenting).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 49–51.
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Board’s remedial authority. But there is nothing about the Court’s
opinion limiting its basic logic to maritime cases. As subsequent developments in the law (which we shall consider below) reveal, the
broad definition of sit-down strikes is a definite part of Southern Steamship’s enduring legacy. Workers who engage in such strikes forfeit
any right to benefit from Board remedies with little further inquiry
into their actual conduct during the protest.
The second and related consequence of Southern Steamship,
which has proved just as significant, is its notion that the illegality of a
strike as such—apart from its character as a sit-down strike—
necessarily precludes reinstatement of workers involved in the strike,
even when the employer causes the entire affair. Southern Steamship
brought this out even more clearly than Fansteel, not only because the
strike itself was so tame by comparison, but because of the Board’s
more focused effort in Southern Steamship to find an unfair labor practice in the discharges themselves. Doing so framed the issue squarely
as whether an employer may fire workers who engage in an illegal
strike without the firing itself constituting a violation of the labor law.
The Court’s answer was clear: workers who engage in such strikes may
not benefit from the Board’s remedial authority and are thus unprotected by the labor law. And again, whether this leaves such workers
with no meaningful right to strike at all, or whether it allows employers to benefit from their own unlawful provocations, is, according to
Southern Steamship, essentially irrelevant.
It remained for the courts and the Board in the aftermath of
Fansteel and Southern Steamship to determine exactly what circumstances would bring these doctrines to bear. Clearly, classic sit-down
strikes, as now more broadly defined by the Court, would fall into this
category. So too would strikes, like Southern Steamship, that either offended federal law directly or that called for remedies requiring the
Board, in that Court’s view, to “ignore other and equally important
326
Congressional objectives.”
But without laying out the relevant parameters, these cases pointed to other circumstances that would
render a strike illegal and disentitle its participants to the protections
of labor law. In particular, to the extent that the criminality of the
strikes in Fansteel and Southern Steamship was part of the reason their
participants lost the protections of labor law, then how far did this
precept extend? Under what other circumstances, beyond sit-down
strikes and maritime “mutinies,” would the criminal nature of a strike
render its participants outside the protections of labor law? Moreo-

326

Id. at 47 (majority opinion).
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ver, to the extent that Southern Steamship also suggested that mere
conflict with important federal policies justified a withdrawal of protections, would conflict with state law and policies have the same effect? Related to this is yet another question posed more directly in
Fansteel but left unanswered in that case: if state authorities in that
case could, without opposition from the Board or the courts, carry
out the criminal prosecution of strikers obviously attempting to vindicate their rights under labor law, when would labor rights ever actually take precedence over the prerogative to criminal prosecution,
whether state or federal? Over the half-century or so after these cases
were decided, the courts, the Board, and Congress drew explicitly on
Fansteel and Southern Steamship to answer this question and in the
process make significant inroads on the right to strike.
B. Sit-Down Strikes and the Lead-up to the Taft-Hartley Act
After the Supreme Court decision in Southern Steamship, sit-down
strikes continued to take place, albeit almost certainly in smaller
numbers. The Chicago area offers a number of examples. In November 1942 some 500 leather workers in Chicago engaged in a
“brief” sit-down before leaving the factory after being told by an offic327
er on the police labor detail to “work or get out.” The same Chicago officer, George Barnes, responded to a sit-down at a Ford facility
in December 1943, and in June 1944 he led a detail that “ejected” 130
workers at a wallpaper factory who were striking to protest their employer’s favoritism in their union’s jurisdictional dispute with an AFL
328
affiliate.
The following April, CIO steel workers in Chicago and
Gary, Indiana, launched numerous quickie sit-down strikes to shut
down their employers’ operations in protest of inadequate processing
329
of grievances.
That October, a sit-down at one of the same steel
330
These
mills was ended when plant guards forced the strikers out.
sit-downs were but the most prominent of hundreds of wildcat and
331
quickie strikes to affect area steel mills during the war years.
Similar protests occurred elsewhere. Some of these involved
large numbers of workers. In June 1944, some 600 CIO textile workers in Passaic, New Jersey, engaged in a sit-down strike of several days
327

500 in Leather Plant Sit-Down, Then Walk Out, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 18, 1942, at

2.
328
Police Rout 130 Sit-Strikers; AFL Accuses CIO, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 2, 1944, at 22;
650 Quit Jobs Over 2 Jobs in Ford War Plant, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 2, 1943, at 2.
329
Sit-Downs Slow Flow of Steel 8 Times in Day, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 26, 1943, at 8.
330
Sitdown Strike Group Ejected at Steel Plant, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 8, 1943, at 7.
331
Gary Sitdown Halts 190 Cars of War Metal, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 10, 1945, at 21.
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332

duration.
A year later, more than 1000 steel workers mounted an
333
overnight sit-down in Philadelphia. A few weeks later, Philadelphia
hosted another sit-down, as 500 machinists struck the Link Belt Com334
pany.
In September of 1945, a sit-down strike briefly shut down
335
Jones & Laughlin’s Pittsburgh area mill. Similarly, in March, 1946,
some 900 employees of Diamond T Motor Car in Chicago undertook
a sit-down strike to protest the company’s layoff of union officers to
336
accommodate returning veterans. The following April, “hundreds”
of female cannery workers loyal to the CIO mounted a sit-down in
Sacramento to protest attempts by a Teamsters local union to prema337
turely assert representation over them.
Remarkably, strikes of this kind continued through 1947, even as
Congress drafted and debated the Taft-Hartley Act. In February of
that year, thirteen miners struck for sixty hours inside a Hazelton,
338
Pennsylvania, coal mine to win a grievance against their employer.
In June, quickie sit-downs were reported at automobile plants in De339
troit. Also in June, NMU sailors engaged in a huge sit-down strike
340
involving thousands of sailors on some 700 ships. That fall, just after the enactment of Taft-Hartley, another sit-down was reported in
Brooklyn, New York, where CIO warehouse workers used the strategy
to try to impede their employer’s effort to replace them with AFL
341
members. The Brooklyn strike is particularly notable as the strikers
342
held the factory for several days before surrendering.
Although even less comprehensive than newspaper accounts,
Board decisions from this period also confirm a number of sit-down

332

600 on Sit-Down Strike, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1944, at 10.
Defy Law by Strike: Steelworkers Vote to Tie Up 3 Philadelphia Plants, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1945, at 4; 1,600 in SKF Sit-Down, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1945, at 2.
334
1,250 Strikers Swell Philadelphia Tie-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1945, at 12.
335
Other Developments in Labor Relations: Strike of 60 Rail Workers Forces Jones &
Laughlin to Halt Operations, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1945, at 2.
336
George Hartmann, 900 in Sitdown Fight Rehiring Policy on Vets, CHI. DAILY TRIB.,
Mar. 2, 1946, at 9.
337
CIO Groups Parade at Struck Canneries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1946, at 15.
338
13 Win Docked Pay, End Mine Sitdown, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1947, at 38.
339
Detroit Walkouts Make 20,000 Idle, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1947, at 20.
340
CIO Maritime Strike Ties Up 700 Ships, Curran Says; Men on Board, WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 1947, at 2.
341
No Workers Report at Container Plant After Fight with CIO Pickets in Brooklyn, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1947, at 23; Picket Line Broken at Strike-Shut Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1947, at 31.
342
80 on Sitdown Strike; Wives Pass Food in, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 15, 1947, at 12.
333
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343

strikes, including an eight-day sit-down strike in 1944 by communi344
cations workers in Elyria, Ohio. The persistence of sit-down strikes
in this period is likewise verified by their occasional mention in court
decisions during this period, albeit usually not as the chief issue in
345
dispute.
As in the period between Fansteel and Southern Steamship, a primary cause of sit-down strikes in the period after Southern Steamship
was the continued resistance of many employers to their most basic
346
obligations under the Wagner Act. The strikes were also launched
as a means of prosecuting grievances and other, more run-of-the mill
347
conflicts that arose regularly in the course of union representation.
Alongside these causes were jurisdictional conflicts between AFL and
CIO unions, whose bitter rivalry very often implicated employers bi348
ased in favor of AFL affiliates.
In all these contexts, though, the
central factor in the unions’ resort to the sit-downs strikes remained
the advantages that the tactic afforded in countering employers’
strike-negating prerogative to continue production during a strike,
which the Supreme Court had already endorsed in the 1938 decision,
349
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. NLRB.
Another reason the strikes remained relatively common was the
Board’s continued adherence to a realistic view that Fansteel and
Southern Steamship did not repeal the right to strike or reduce its lawful form to a mere symbol; instead, the Board sought to chart a compromise between the holding of these cases and the basic rights of labor as protected by the statute. The Board had always taken a dim
view of excessively violent and blatantly unlawful behavior by strikers,
expressing this view, as we have seen, in its litigation of the sit-down
strike cases themselves; after Southern Steamship, its scrutiny of such

343
In many of these cases, the sit-down strike was tangential to the issues before
the Board. See, e.g., In re Heisler Mfg. Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1114, 1143 (1946); In re
Bergmann’s Inc., 71 N.L.R.B. 1020, 1032 n.15 (1946).
344
See, e.g., In re Elyria Tel. Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 432, 436 (1945).
345
See, e.g., NLRB v. J.L. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F.2d 556, 558 (8th Cir. 1944) (using
a 1943 sit-down strike of elevator operators as background in an NLRB enforcement
action against an employer).
346
See, e.g., Police Rout 130 Sit-Strikers; AFL Accuses CIO, supra note 328; Sit-downs
Slow Flow of Steel 8 Times in Day, supra note 329.
347
See, e.g., Hartmann, supra note 336; Gary Sitdown Halts 190 Cars of War Metal,
supra note 331.
348
See FINE, supra note 1, at 73–79; Police Rout 130 Sit Strikers; AFL Accuses CIO, supra note 328.
349
304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
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350

behavior was even more exacting.
Nevertheless, as in the wake of
Fansteel, the Board declined automatically to deny workers the protections of the labor law simply because something resembling a sitdown strike was alleged by the employer or the press or played a minor role amidst a complicated labor dispute. Instead, the Board
looked to the nature of the action and paid special attention to
whether “employees took possession of the plant, withheld it against
the wishes of the respondent [employer], or had to be forcibly
351
ejected.”
Of particular significance to this position was NLRB v. American
Manufacturing Company, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit validated the Board’s view that not all strike activity on
352
company property necessarily constituted an illegal sit-down strike.
Through the 1940s, the Board cited American Manufacturing several
353
Significantly, the
times to support similar administrative rulings.
Board’s approach to sit-down strikes accompanied its efforts in the
late 1930s and 1940s to distinguish acts of picket-line violence or other strike-related “misconduct” that justified discharge from those that
354
did not and would admit reinstatement. A key feature of this policy, which was reflected in its decision in Republic Steel and would for a
time frame the development of law in this area, was the Board’s unwillingness either to investigate or to presume criminal culpability—
and therefore ineligibility for reinstatement—where an employee had
355
not been found guilty by criminal trial or plea.
In fact, even as sit-down strikes and other sensational acts of labor militancy became rarer, mass-picketing and more mundane
forms of strike-related violence and criminality remained common
features of labor conflict. In quite a few cases in the 1940s, strikers
organized huge protests of over 1000 picketers, who harangued and
intimidated company managers and would-be crossovers and re-

350

See, e.g., In re Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 912, 930–32 (1944).
In re Nat’l Container Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 565, 585 (1944); see also In re Draper
Corp., 52 N.L.R.B. 1477, 1493 (1943) (considering the same factors).
352
106 F.2d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 1939).
353
See, e.g., In re Draper, 52 N.L.R.B. at 1493; In re W. Cartridge Co., 48 N.L.R.B.
434, 454 (1943).
354
See, e.g., In re Ind. Desk Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 76, 96 (1944); In re Berkshire Knitting
Mills, 17 N.L.R.B. 239, 291–92 (1939); In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219,
387–88 (1938), enforced as modified, 107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1939), modified, 311 U.S. 7
(1940).
355
Walter Daykin, Treatment of Violence in Labor Disputes, 26 IOWA L. REV. 772, 777–
78 (1941). For examples, see In re Swift & Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 991, 1010 (1939); In re
Republic Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 387–88 (1938).
351

WHITE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

52

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

3/15/2010 12:28 PM

[Vol. 40:1

356

placement workers.
Not infrequently, protests of this kind culmi357
nated in court injunctions, violent confrontations, and mass arrests.
A notable example is the 1946 strike at tractor and machine maker
Allis-Chalmers (centered at its complex in West Allis, Wisconsin) that
featured thousands of picketers, numerous violent clashes, and hun358
dreds of arrests.
The strike would assume a prominent place in
subsequent congressional efforts to amend the labor law—even
though the many arrests in this case gave more witness to how free
courts and prosecutors already were to enjoin and prosecute workers
359
who embraced mass picketing and other confrontational methods.
As we shall see, even as the Board struggled to develop an approach
that would preserve basic labor rights amidst such tumult (which, as
with sit-down strikes, was often instigated by employers in the first
place) without seeming to suggest the Board’s approval of unionsponsored violence and disorder, these tactics quickly joined the sitdown strikes as the focus of conservative criticism of the Board’s sup360
posed contempt for court decisions.
Though quite justifiable as a sound exercise in the realistic and
pragmatic use of its administrative authority, the Board’s approach to

356
See, e.g., 8,000 Men Walk Out, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1941, at 1; 5,000 Pickets to Mass
Today at Columbia, Strikers Report, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1946, at 1; 1,000 in Picket Line in
Midtown Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1942, at 12; Pickets Are Routed by Police in Yonkers;
Demonstration at Grant Street Broken Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1941, at 52; A.H. Raskin,
200,000 Quit in 16 States; Mass Picketing is Started, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1946, at 1.
357
See, e.g., Film Studio Strike Settled; 400 Arrested on Final Day, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25,
1945, at 1; 4 Hurt in Detroit Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1947, at 2; George Hartmann,
Sheriff Offers Evanston Aid in Curbing Pickets, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 9, 1946, at 12; Limit
of 21 Pickets at Plant Ordered in Writ Against Union, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 22, 1946, at 2;
New CIO Mob Battles Police at Allis Plant, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 26, 1946, at 1; Pickets Are
Routed by Police in Yonkers; Demonstration at Grant Store Broken Up, supra note 356; A.H.
Raskin, Clash in GE Strike Brings 19 Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1946, at 17; 700 Film
Strike Pickets Arrested; Police Disperse 1,500 at Columbia; New Demonstration Ordered Today,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1946, at 1 [hereinafter 700 Film Strike Pickets Arrested]; Violence
Flares at Yale & Towne, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1946, at 1; Will Resume Picketing; Kentucky
Telephone Strikers Act Despite Arrest of 151, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1947, at 4; W.U. Asks
Court Aid as Police Battle Pickets, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 26, 1946, at 3.
358
CIO Mobs Blockade Plant; Hurl Barrage of Rocks Thru Allis Windows, CHI. DAILY
TRIB., Oct. 29, 1946, at 1; New CIO Mob Battles Police at Allis Plant, supra note 357; Rioting CIO Mob Battles Police at Allis Plant; 4 Hurt and 46 Arrested in New Demonstration,
CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 5, 1946, at 6; 75 Injured in Allis Rioting; 1,200 Battle Police; Autos
Tipped, Burned, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 10, 1946, at 1. The conflict with Allis-Chalmers
in 1946 was the culmination of a concerted strategy of company resistance to leftleaning UAW organizers’ efforts to unionize the plant. ZIEGER, supra note 1, at 126–
28.
359
See infra note 397.
360
GROSS, supra note 110, passim.
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such cases proved unacceptable in conservative circles and to the
courts. Notwithstanding the Second Circuit’s approval in American
361
Manufacturing and similar decisions in other circuits, many courts
rejected the Board’s textured view of sit-down strikes and related
362
conduct.
Even more significantly, the Board’s realism quickly attracted the hostile attention of congressional conservatives, for whom
it informed a broader effort to transform both the politics of the
363
Board and the substance of the Wagner Act.
This effort would soon change the Board entirely, as the conservatives convinced President Roosevelt to replace three members
(Donald Wakefield Smith in 1939, Chairman Madden in 1940, and
Edwin Smith in 1941) who had been extremely important to develop364
ing the Board’s early program. Although these men were replaced
by relatively moderate members, this drive to transform the Board
would continue until, by the time of Taft-Hartley, conservatives dom365
inated the Board. Significantly, these changes in membership were
but the most notable expression of a far more comprehensive effort
to purge the whole agency of people identified by business groups or
conservatives in the labor movement as too supportive of industrial
unionism, political progressivism, or a robust view of labor rights
366
more generally.
In 1939, the House of Representatives convened a special com367
Chaired by Howard K. Smith, a
mittee to investigate the NLRB.
reactionary from Virginia, the “Smith Committee” represented the
first important congressional attack on the Board and the Wagner
Act, which, despite disquiet with the direction of labor politics, had
up to that point remained largely invulnerable amidst the tumultuous
368
and complex politics of the Second New Deal. The committee embarked on a sweeping investigation of the Board’s policies, personnel,
361

See, e.g., NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F.2d 167, 176–77 (3d Cir. 1939)
(distinguishing Fansteel and upholding Board-ordered reinstatement where violence
was minimal, mutually instigated, and attenuated from strike).
362
See, e.g., In re Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 204–05 (4th Cir. 1944); In re Clinchfield Coal Corp., 145 F.2d 66, 72–73 (4th Cir. 1944); Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 120
F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1941); Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 411,
415 (5th Cir. 1938); Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. NLRB, 97 F.2d 531, 536 (4th Cir.
1938).
363
GROSS, supra note 110, at 79, 85–93, 100–08.
364
Id. at 78–79, 211–13, 238–39.
365
Id. at 232–40.
366
Id. at 131–50.
367
Id. at 151.
368
Id. at 151–59.
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and ideological orientation; its purported areas of focus fell into four
main categories of supposed impropriety: “Anti-American affiliations
and associations of Board personnel”; “extra-legal actions” by the
Board; improper “interpretations of the act” by Board members; and
369
improper enforcement of the act by Board personnel. Besides the
obvious aim of undermining the Board’s legitimacy and forcing
changes in its composition, the committee’s work was also geared to
generating a package of proposed amendments to the Act and a
370
record to support their passage.
The Smith Committee enjoyed almost unlimited access to Board
files, gathered thousands of questionnaires, and interviewed under
oath and in open hearings scores of Board personnel, experts in law
371
and industrial relations, employers, and union officials.
Although
occasionally concerned with actual instances of abuse or impropriety,
the committee’s efforts mainly involved mining the Board’s cases and
records for complex situations and exigent circumstances that could
be manipulated to cast the agency and its staff as biased or incompe372
tent. At perhaps its worst, the committee’s efforts devolved into an
attempt to sully the Board for having (for the time) an inordinately
373
high number of professional women on its staff.
The Board’s approach to sit-down strikes was an area of special
concern to the committee. The transcripts and records of the committee’s hearings, which run to nearly 8000 pages, are peppered with
374
references to and inquiries about Fansteel as well as Republic Steel.
The Smith Committee’s final report—which historian James Gross
aptly characterizes as a thoroughly “one-sided and often distorted ap375
praisal” —condemned the Board’s position in Fansteel as “unto376
ward,” “strange,” and thoroughly illegitimate.
Worse, the report
claimed, the Board seemed not to have abandoned this “reprehensible policy,” as evidenced by the fact that it attempted to distinguish
Fansteel in another case, McNeely & Price, in which the employer had
not actually discharged the sit-down strikers but instead discriminated
among them, and which was still being litigated when Fansteel was de369

H.R. REP. NO. 76-3109, at 5, 62, 96 (1940).
GROSS, supra note 110, at 187.
371
Id. at 156–60, 164–71.
372
Id. at 173–75, 193.
373
Id. at 181–83.
374
Hearings Before Spec. Comm. to Investigate the National Labor Relations Board, 76th
Cong. 675, 1647, 2512–15, 3412–13, 4890–91, 4983–84, 7283 (1940).
375
GROSS, supra note 110, at 203.
376
H.R. REP. NO. 76-3109, at 81 (1941).
370
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377

cided. Perhaps most significantly, the committee’s criticisms of the
Board seem to have had less to do with the intransigent and supposedly duplicitous quality of the Board’s decision making, or the fear
that it would defiantly protect sit-down strikes of the classic sort, than
with its efforts to justify, on any grounds, the reinstatement of strikers
who engaged in any kind of conduct (including violent or illegal
conduct) that fundamentally challenged employers’ traditional hegemony in the workplace.
This appeal to Fansteel to rationalize a broader attack on the
right to strike was clearly borne out in the suite of amendments to the
Wagner Act that the committee recommended, which among other
things would have revised section 2(3) of the Act to disqualify from
reinstatement anyone “who engaged in violence or unlawful destruction or seizure of property in connection with any labor dispute or
378
unfair labor practice.” So broad was this language that in a different context it caused William Green of the AFL to qualify his
erstwhile support for the committee’s work, as Green correctly perceived that such language would jeopardize the right to strike in any
379
contentious setting.
At nearly the same time that the Smith Committee embarked on
its investigations of the Board, so too did the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor in the course of considering a suite of bills to
amend the Act that were roughly akin to the Smith bill. Although
quite a bit less sensational and one-sided than the House hearings,
and ultimately less influential to the course of labor law and policy,
the Senate hearings did go to great lengths to criticize the Board, in
that senators repeatedly challenged Board members and staff to explain the agency’s approach to sit-down strikes, particularly during
380
their height in 1937 and 1938.
Opponents of the Board (and the
377
A panel of the Third Circuit strongly rebuked the Board for attempting, in
answering the company’s appeal, to distinguish the facts in McNeely from Fansteel.
McNeely & Price Co. v. NLRB, 106 F.2d 878, 878–79 (3d Cir. 1939). Other circuits
took a very different view of this issue. See, e.g., Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB,
114 F.2d 849, 858 (7th Cir. 1940).
378
GROSS, supra note 110, at 199. The statute would also have dramatically altered
the structure of the NLRB, changed the way the Board determined bargaining units
and conducted elections, limited the scope of the duty to bargain, provided for more
exacting judicial review of Board decisions, protected employers’ right to make antiunion statements, and rewritten the preamble of the Act, replacing its prounionization language with more “neutral” text. Id. at 196–99.
379
Id. at 207.
380
Hearings Before S. Comm. on Education and Labor on Legis. to Amend the National
Labor Relations Act, 76th Cong. 15, 63, 117–18, 425, 481–82, 1600–01, 2300, 2455–72
(1939) [hereinafter Hearings on NLRA Amendments].

WHITE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

56

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

3/15/2010 12:28 PM

[Vol. 40:1

CIO) from industry, labor, and Congress were allowed to repeatedly
381
accuse the Board of ignoring the Court’s decision in Fansteel. More
ominously, this criticism also entailed a charge that the Board was apt
to continue to ignore Fansteel by taking a critical, case-by-case approach to reinstatement in cases involving strike-related violence—
and that the Act should therefore be amended to categorically ban
382
reinstatement in such cases.
The next year, the committee considered still more legislation to amend the Act and transform the
Board, thus revisiting the surrounding sit-down strikes and the
383
Board’s reaction to them in light of Supreme Court precedent.
However disreputable its methods, the Smith Committee’s efforts to undermine the Board and generate support to transform the
agency and the Wagner Act paid off in spades, as both the public and
the Congress became significantly more receptive to such legisla384
tion. In the summer of 1940, the House passed the Smith Commit385
tee’s bill by a wide majority (258 to 129). The Smith bill died, however, when the Senate Education and Labor Committee refused to
386
act on it. Nevertheless, the death of this bill did not end the effort
to amend the Wagner Act, nor did it prevent conservatives from seeking a more comprehensive roll-back of the right to strike and of labor
rights more broadly. Indeed, in these respects, the Smith Committee’s efforts were only the beginning.
C. The Sit-Down Strikes and the Taft-Hartley Act
Through the early 1940s, opponents of the Wagner Act continued to propose legislation to repeal or transform the statute; in the
ten years between Jones & Laughlin and Taft-Hartley, around 200 bills
387
were introduced in Congress with that aim.
At the center of this
legislative agenda remained the goals that were first cultivated by the
Smith Committee: changing the basic substance of the Act itself to
narrow the definition of employer unfair labor practices, adding union unfair labor practices, and altering the structure of the NLRB and
the manner in which it handled both union elections and unfair la381
382

Id. at 1072–74, 2455–72, 2474, 2030.
See Id. at 63, 86–87, 198–215, 296, 520, 1498–500, 1507–08, 2128, 2138–39,

2474.
383

See Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Education and Labor on H.R. 9195, 76th Cong.
100, 178, 219, 221, 246–48 (1940).
384
GROSS, supra note 110, at 187.
385
Id. at 210.
386
Id. at 210–11.
387
MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 127, at 333.
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388

bor practice complaints against employers.
While none of these
bills was enacted, the Smith bill itself would form the template for the
Taft-Hartley Act, which would dramatically transform American labor
389
law and labor relations.
It is common to explain Taft-Hartley as a reaction to the dramatic expansion of union power that occurred in the wake of the Wagner
Act and as a response to the sense that this power was being abused
390
and needed regulation.
This account has some appeal in view of
the huge gains in union membership during this period, as well as
the enormous strike waves that occurred during and after the Second
World War, and it is probably at least partially accurate. But the fact
that Taft-Hartley so faithfully adhered to the agenda developed by the
Smith Committee shows very clearly that the statute was rooted in the
current of organized anti-unionism that underlay the great wave of
sit-down strikes of 1937 and 1938 and that persisted through the
1940s. Further evidence of this connection appears in the fact that
the very same coalition of business groups, conservative unionists,
and reactionary politicians who spearheaded the earlier attempts at
391
“reform” also played the lead role in enacting Taft-Hartley.
This
coalition was in no way satisfied by the rightward shift of the Board
and its policies in the period during and after the Smith Committee
investigations, nor was it content with the enactment of numerous
state laws during this period that limited the right to strike (including
barring sit-down strikes) and otherwise “equalized” the rights of labor
and capital, which in many cases were directed specifically at regulating sit-down strikes and punishing strikers for strike-related vi392
olence.
Supporters of Taft-Hartley relentlessly constructed images of the
Board and the Wagner Act as complicit in a perverted and out-ofcontrol system of labor relations desperately in need of reform. To
this end, they invoked Fansteel and Southern Steamship not simply for
what these cases seemed to say about sit-down strikes, but as mandates
against strike-related violence, wildcat strikes, and mass picketing, as
well as grounds for indicting the Board’s purported indulgence of
such conduct. This claim was built, in part, on another series of investigations of the Board itself by House and Senate committees, in388

GROSS, supra note 110, at 252–53.
Id. at 253.
390
See, e.g., MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 127, at 272.
391
Id. at 346–62.
392
Id. at 320–21, 323–25, 327; Harry A. Millis & Harold A. Katz, A Decade of State
Labor Legislation, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 282, 283, 290, 301–04 (1947).
389
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cluding pointed questioning of the Board’s conservative chairman,
393
Paul Herzog, regarding the Board’s fidelity to Southern Steamship.
Even more cutting was the report of the House Committee on Education and Labor on the lead bill in that chamber, which grudgingly
confessed that Fansteel and Southern Steamship had some effect on
Board policy. But this, the report asserted, was “very recent, inspired,
394
it seems, by the public demand for fair labor regulation.”
The report continued:
In cases involving violence in strikes, the Board has seemed reluctant to follow the decisions of the courts. It is inclined to reinstate, with back pay, strikers whom employers discharge for what
the Board seems to regard as minor crimes, such as interfering
with the United States mail, obstructing railroad right-of-way, discharging firearms, rioting, carrying concealed weapons, malicious
395
destruction of property, and assault and battery.

This interpretation of Fansteel and Southern Steamship to justify
broader attacks on the right to strike was also backed by extensive
and well cultivated testimony on strike violence, mass picketing, wildcat strikes, and claims that existing laws and processes were inadequate to deal with these problems. The House committee stands out
in this regard, as it repeatedly allowed company executives and managers, congressmen, conservative unionists, and the occasional worker to present such conduct as common features of post-Wagner Act
396
labor relations.
The 1946 Allis-Chalmers strike was singled out,
along with a couple of other disputes, and mined for shocking infor397
mation of this sort.
Similarly extensive testimony was adduced on
mass picketing that occurred in a strike that same year at Detroit
Steel Products, which included picketing of a company manager’s
398
home.
For good measure, the House committee inserted into its
record a great number of evocative photographs of strike violence
399
and mass picketing from these and other strikes.
Hearings before

393
See Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Education & Labor on Bills to Amend and Repeal the National Labor Relations Act, 80th Cong. 3108–09 (1947) [hereinafter House
Hearings on Taft-Hartley].
394
H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 27 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 318 (1948).
395
Id.
396
House Hearings on Taft-Hartley, supra note 393, at 4, 29–32, 109, 424, 984, 2144–
50, 2170, 2530.
397
Id. at 1359–74; see also id. at 263–332 (discussing 1946 Pennsylvania brewers
strike).
398
Id. at 445–74.
399
Id. at 222, 461–63, 1436–42.
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the Senate Labor and Public Welfare committee developed a similar,
400
albeit somewhat less sensational, record.
Congress drew on these records to justify dramatic proposals to
change the statute. Most striking among these was section 12 of the
bill favored by the House, H.R. 3020, which would have created an
array of “unlawful concerted activities,” defined in large part to include violent or threatening strike activity; “any sympathy strike, jurisdictional strike, monopolistic strike, or illegal boycott, or any sitdown strike or other concerted interference with an employer’s operations conducted by remaining on the employer’s premises;” or any
401
wildcat or quickie-type sit-down strike. Such conduct would have
been made enjoinable by federal courts, notwithstanding the Norris402
LaGuardia Act.
Workers found to have committed any such conduct would have lost the protections of the statute and faced individ403
ual damage liability.
While this broadside attack on the right to strike did not survive
404
harmonization with the lead Senate bill, other sanctions on conduct
by unions and their agents and limits on Board remedial authority,
which were also included in early versions of the Senate legislation,
405
did appear in the final act.
Particularly notable in this regard is a
provision eventually enacted as section 8(b)(1)(A), which deemed it
an unfair labor practice for a union or its agents to “restrain or
coerce” employees in their exercise of the right (accorded by
amendments to section 7) to refrain from union membership; as well
as limits imposed by amendments to section 10(c) on the Board’s
power to reinstate or grant back pay awards to workers fired “for
406
cause.” Although not as explicit or as extreme as the provisions on
unlawful concerted activity in the House bill, the section 8(b)(1)(A)
and 10(c) provisions were also clearly intended to work together to
redress the Board’s supposed infidelity to the spirit of Fansteel and
Southern Steamship. Section 8(b)(1)(A)’s ambiguous terms on coer-

400

See Hearings Before S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong. 44–50, 945–
46, 966–67, 1716–18, 1732 (1947).
401
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. (1st Sess. 1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, at
158, 205.
402
Id. at 206.
403
Id.
404
H.R. REP. NO. 80-510, at 1, 58–59 (1947) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, at 505, 562–63.
405
Id.
406
H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 1, 27, 42, 52–53, 58 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra
note 394, at 292, 318, 333, 343–44, 349.

WHITE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

60

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

3/15/2010 12:28 PM

[Vol. 40:1

cion and restraint were fully intended to prohibit all manner of conduct, including not only sit-down strikes but mass picketing and pick407
et-line violence more broadly. Although the final version of the Act
did not explicitly provide for punishing a violation of section
8(b)(1)(A) by disqualifying the responsible worker or workers from
reinstatement, and only imposed liability on unions and their agents,
the bill’s authors made clear their intention that section 10(c) be
408
read together with section 8(b)(1)(A) to have precisely that effect.
At the same time, the amended section 10(c)’s limitations on reinstatement and back pay were not confined to conduct constituting unfair labor practices; instead, the provision was intended more broadly
to bar such remedies in any case involving sit-down strikes, strikes fea409
turing violence or criminality, or mass picketing. Whatever the mechanism, the proponents of these changes candidly anticipated that
the thrust of these limits on Board remedies would be to deny the offending workers the basic rights otherwise accorded them in sections
7 and 13. In fact, for good measure, the drafters subtly transformed
the right to strike language in section 13, qualifying the right as
granted by the Wagner Act with the terms, “except as specifically pro410
vided for herein.”
The amendments were perceived in the same light by TaftHartley’s opponents in Congress, who criticized the section
8(b)(1)(A) provision in terms directed at similar provisions proposed
by the Smith Committee, such as requiring the Board to “take over
411
local police functions” best left to traditional, local processes of law.
In similar resonance with earlier debates, opponents criticized section 10(c) as preventing the Board from making equitable decisions
in cases that involved mutual misconduct or even employer provoca412
tion.

407

MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 127, at 445–47.
H.R. REP. NO. 80-510, at 1, 38–39, 42 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra
note 394, at 505, 542–43, 546; see also S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 50 (1947), reprinted in 1
NLRB, supra note 394, at 456 (providing supplemental views).
409
See H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 1, 42, reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, at 292,
333; H.R. REP. NO. 80-510, at 1, 38–39, 55 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra
note 394, at 505, 542–43, 559.
410
See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006).
411
See H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 1, 64, 82–83, reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, at
292, 355, 373–74.
412
H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 1, 64, 91–92, reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, at
292, 355, 382–83; S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 1, 21–22, reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394,
at 463, 483–84.
408
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IV. MILITANCY PROHIBITED: THE SIT-DOWN STRIKES’ LEGACY IN
MODERN LABOR LAW AND LABOR RELATIONS
The framework of legal opposition to the sit-down strikes that
emerged in the years between the Fansteel strike and the passage of
Taft-Hartley has had a lasting effect on American labor relations, centered on a dramatic curtailment of the right to strike. The aim of this
Part is to show how this program coalesced.
The process can be understood in terms of several overlapping
developments. First, the Taft-Hartley amendments translated the legal and political opposition to the sit-down strikes of the 1930s and
1940s into a body of Board jurisprudence that has substantially and
permanently limited the right of reinstatement in the context of
413
picket-line violence and other forms of strike-related misconduct.
As a result, unions have been barred from bringing to bear effective
forms of protest. Second, Fansteel and Southern Steamship have armed
the courts with a jurisprudence well suited to police aggressively the
boundaries of acceptable strike behavior, in particular by holding
watch over Board efforts to reinstate strikers notwithstanding some
414
degree of misconduct on their part.
Third, the response of the
Board and the courts to the sit-down strikes has helped to frame a
particular notion of preemption law that has authorized state and local governments to assume prominent, and often reactionary, roles in
415
the regulation of strike misconduct.
Closely related to this is the
doctrine derived from Southern Steamship that labor rights must yield
to other regimes of federal policy whenever they might come into
conflict. While not typically relevant to strikes and related protests,
this rule too has significantly limited other labor rights and stands as
a telling symbol of the degradation of labor law.
A. The Board, Taft-Hartley, and the Diminution of Reinstatement
Rights
The discussion in Part III makes clear that the most important
long-term legacy of the sit-down strikes is their role in securing the
passage of Taft-Hartley. The statute of course was passed over Presi416
dent Truman’s veto by a wide majority, representing the culmination of years of anti-labor politics rooted in the resistance to any functional regime of labor rights that would actually achieve anything like
413
414
415
416

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See GROSS, supra note 110, at 259.
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a legally mandated (or mediated) balance of power in the relationship between labor and capital. Taft-Hartley’s supporters were well
aware that confessing to this agenda would hardly have advanced
their cause. Indeed, in the past, supporters of the Wagner Act and
the original Board had successfully opposed similar legislation in part
by characterizing proposed reforms as unwarranted, and perhaps
417
pretextual, entrenchments on basic labor rights. But the claim that
amending the Wagner Act was necessary to prevent the kind of lawlessness so thoroughly associated with the sit-down strikes subverted
this criticism. It may well be that an anti-labor statute broadly akin to
Taft-Hartley would have been enacted in any case. But it is also clear
that the sit-down strikes made the enactment of such a profoundly
anti-labor law much easier than it would otherwise have been. The
specific appeal to the sit-down strikes during the legislative process
likely made it possible for Taft-Hartley’s supporters to mount a more
aggressive assault on labor rights than would otherwise have been
feasible and, critically, to focus this assault more directly on the right
to strike.
Key personnel with the Board under President Truman, including its conservative chairman, Paul Herzog, opposed Taft-Hartley and
initially signaled they could not in good conscience abide its man418
dates.
Even before Board membership was reconstituted under
President Eisenhower—a development that finally led the Board in a
419
decisively anti-labor direction —the agency embraced the limitations that Taft-Hartley had placed, via section 8(a)(1)(A) and the
amendments to sections 10(c) and 13, on its authority to protect the
right to strike. Since Taft-Hartley, the Board has largely adhered to
these statutory mandates, making clear that reinstatement is improper when workers engage in serious acts of violence or destruction,
including physically assaulting replacement workers and crossovers or
420
company officials, and throwing missiles at replacement workers
421
and crossovers or their cars.
Neither criminal conviction nor formal criminal charges are required for reinstatement to be denied; on
417

Hearings on NLRA Amendments, supra note 380, at 475, 489–90, 520, 523–24,
4215, 4320–22.
418
JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS
POLICY, 1947–1994, at 1–13 (1995).
419
Id. at 114–17.
420
See, e.g., NLRB v. Kelko Corp., 178 F.2d 578, 582–83 (4th Cir. 1949); BartlettCollins Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 144, 171–73, 176 (1977).
421
See, e.g., Bryan Infants Wear Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1307–08 (1978); Int’l
Harvester Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 166, 166–69 (1976); Beaver Bros. Baking Co., 171
N.L.R.B. 700, 718 (1968).
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occasion, the Board has even applied this position on violence and
the like so strictly as to deny reinstatement to workers innocent of any
misconduct, simply because of what other unknown persons might
422
have done. The Board likewise denies reinstatement where strikers
verbally threaten replacement workers, crossovers, or other company
employees, or where workers menace such persons through symbolic
423
methods, such as by possessing a weapon on the picket line.
The
Board also denies reinstatement where workers stage mass pickets
that coerce replacement workers and crossovers or that impede
424
access to the employer’s establishment. Of course, if any such misconduct is attributable to the union or its agents, it will also constitute
grounds for a section 8(b)(1)(A) violation, and thus become the sub425
ject of a prospectively worded cease and desist order.
To be sure, the Board has continued to make some effort to balance these policies against the law’s ostensible protection of the right
of workers to strike free of excessive coercion and discrimination by
their employers, holding that “minor acts of misconduct” would not
426
necessarily abrogate its prerogative to reinstate workers; that provo427
cation is sometimes a relevant consideration in misconduct cases;
that workers otherwise guilty of misconduct might yet be entitled to
reinstatement if their employer has condoned the behavior in ques428
tion; and that under its so-called “Thayer Doctrine,” the Board may
order the reinstatement of strikers guilty of misconduct where the
employer itself has committed serious violations of the labor law and
429
reinstatement would best advance the purposes of the law. Similar-

422

See, e.g., BVD Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1412, 1415–17 (1954).
See, e.g., Va. Holding Corp., 293 N.L.R.B. 182, 188, 210 (1989); Gem Urethane
Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1349, 1353–54 (1987).
424
See, e.g., Metro. Dist. Council of Phila. & Vicinity, 281 N.L.R.B. 493, 497–98
(1986); Local 1291, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 266 N.L.R.B. 1204, 1204–07 (1983);
Shopmen’s Local Union No. 455, 243 N.L.R.B. 340, 340–41 (1979); Metal Polishers
Int’l Union, Local No. 67, 200 N.L.R.B. 335, 335–37 (1972).
425
See, e.g., Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 134 N.L.R.B. 1713, 1713,
1724–26 (1961); In re Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 79 N.L.R.B.
1487, 1507, 1517–18 (1948). Likewise, evidence of a section 8(a)(1) violation may be
used by an employer to defend against reinstatement. See, e.g., Gem Urethane Corp.,
284 N.L.R.B. 1349, 1352–53 (1987).
426
See Coronet Casuals Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 304, 305 (1973).
427
See, e.g., Ornamental Iron Work Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 473, 473 n.1 (1989); Mosher
Steel Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1163, 1169 (1976).
428
See NLRB v. Colonial Press, Inc., 509 F.2d 850, 854–57 (8th Cir. 1975); Jones &
McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 97, 103 (7th Cir. 1971); Fed. Prescription Serv.,
203 N.L.R.B. 975, 975–76 (1973).
429
NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 752–55 (1st Cir. 1953).
423
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ly, while the Board has adhered to the spirit of Taft-Hartley in denying the protections of the labor law to mass picketers, it has done so
not simply by counting the picketers but rather by inquiring whether
such picketing was truly violent or coercive, or has actually blocked
430
access.
The nature of these qualifications to the law of misconduct,
however, should not be exaggerated. They reflect less a fundamental
opposition to the Taft-Hartley amendments than modest efforts by
the Board to accommodate the law of misconduct to the complicated
and often tumultuous realities of modern labor relations. Notably
absent in such cases is the kind of aggressively realistic prioritization
of basic labor rights that often characterized the Board’s approach to
such cases in the late 1930s and (to a degree) early 1940s. Nevertheless, even these modest attempts to accommodate the concept of misconduct to the larger purposes of the statute have proved unacceptable to conservative politicians and academics and objectionable to
431
some courts.
In 1984, such hostility combined with changes in
Board personnel and politics to prompt a re-articulation of the
Board’s approach to misconduct cases. In Clear Pine Moulding, Inc.,
the Board appeared to renounce the Thayer Doctrine, particularly
the idea of balancing the severity of the employer’s violations of the
432
statute against the striker’s misconduct. Instead, appealing explicitly to the legislative history of Taft-Hartley and the debate surrounding
Fansteel, the Board re-emphasized that reinstatement would be prohibited whenever a striker’s misconduct approximates a violation of
section 8(b)(1)—that is, whenever it “reasonably tend[s] to coerce or
intimidate employees [including replacement workers or crossovers]

430

See, e.g., United Steelworkers, 137 N.L.R.B. 95, 98 (1962); Local Union No.
5895, United Steelworkers, 132 N.L.R.B. 127, 128–30 (1961); In re Local No. 1150,
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 84 N.L.R.B. 972, 973–79 (1949). The Board is
apparently constrained in this regard by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 639–40 & n.4 (1958).
431
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 359, 359–62 (3d Cir. 1982);
NLRB v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835, 843–44 (5th Cir. 1978); Associated
Grocers of New England v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333, 1336 (1st Cir. 1977); NLRB v. W.C.
McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519, 527–28 (3d Cir. 1977); Closing the Legal Loophole for Union Violence: Hearing on S.230 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1–3, 5–6,
7–13 (1997) (statements of Sen. Orrin Hatch and Sen. Strom Thurmond, and opening testimony of former Att’y Gen. of the United States Edwin Meese); Labor Violence:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. 1–9 (1985)
(opening statements of senators regarding labor violence); ARMAND J. THIEBOLT, JR. &
THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNION VIOLENCE: THE RECORD AND THE RESPONSE BY COURTS,
LEGISLATURES, AND THE NLRB passim (1983).
432
See Clear Pine Moulding, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1047 n.25 (1984).
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in the exercise of rights protected under the Act.” The Board also
held that even mere words, unaccompanied by threatening conduct,
434
could meet this test. Furthermore, the Board also emphasized that
this limit on reinstatement rights should apply from an objective
perspective—that is, without regard to whether any employees were
435
actually coerced or intimidated.
The Board has since retreated somewhat from Clear Pine, indicating that Clear Pine did not entirely abolish the Thayer Doctrine, that
employer condonation would remain a valid consideration in misconduct cases, and that not every instance of misconduct would pro436
hibit reinstatement.
But as with other apparently significant shifts
in the Board’s law of reinstatement, these moves should not be accorded greater significance than they deserve. For Clear Pine itself is
best viewed from the outset as less about shifting doctrine than
reemphasizing the Board’s fidelity to the overall program of Fansteel
(and, less directly, Southern Steamship) as embodied in the Taft-Hartley
amendments.
Notwithstanding such apparent vacillations, the
Board’s position on reinstatement has remained broadly consistent in
the post-Taft-Hartley period—and consistently adherent to that statute’s basic agenda. Simply put, the reactionary vision that emerged
in the era of the sit-down strike has been thoroughly realized in a
body of labor law that denies reinstatement to workers whose protest
tactics are substantially offensive to property rights and conservative
notions of social order.
B. Fansteel, Southern Steamship and the Judicial Denigration of
Labor Rights
In the decades since Taft-Hartley, courts have regularly drawn
directly on Fansteel and Southern Steamship to circumscribe the boun437
daries of the right to strike.
The most frequent expression of this
practice has been the courts’ use of these cases to rebuke Board at-

433

Id. at 1047 (citing W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d at 527).
Id.
435
Id.
436
See, e.g., Detroit Newspaper Agency, 340 N.L.R.B. 1019, 1024 (2003); Briar
Crest Nursing Home, 333 N.L.R.B. 935, 938 (2001); Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300
N.L.R.B. 1075, 1075 n.3 (1990); Chesapeake Plywood, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 201, 201
(1989).
437
See NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 998, 1003–05 (8th Cir. 1965) (listing
cases where courts have tied Fansteel or Southern Steamship to construction of sections
8(b)(1)(A), 10(c), or 13).
434
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tempts to reinstate strikers—as occurred in the lead-up to Clear Pine.
Notably, the courts have resorted to the sit-down strike cases in this
fashion, not for the purpose of correcting gross deviations by the
Board from the letter of the Taft-Hartley amendments or the clear
holdings of Fansteel and Southern Steamship, but rather to rein in modest efforts of the Board to accommodate these doctrines with the ba439
sic purposes of the labor law. Especially worthy of mention in this
regard are cases where the courts have appealed to these earlier cases
to justify decisions that they apparently would not or could not base
440
in the Taft-Hartley amendments.
A notorious example of this is the 1947 (pre-Taft-Hartley) decision of the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Perfect Circle Co., where the
court held that Fansteel required that it overturn the Board’s reinstatement of four strikers because they supposedly barred the plant
441
manager from entering the plant.
The court’s decision is particularly notable in light of the fact that the picketing in question was,
without dispute, entirely peaceful and that the Board (and the trial
examiner) had found that the strikers had no intention of blocking
the manager’s entry, were not hostile or threatening to him, and only
442
partially and momentarily obstructed his movement.
For the majority, these determinations had to yield to the view that the employees’ actions constituted “a forceable denial of the employer’s
right to go upon its property . . . equivalent [to] a seizure of the employer’s property,” and that this placed their conduct squarely within
443
the rule of Fansteel. The court in fact quite reifies Fansteel, repeatedly quoting the decision’s reactionary pronouncements on the interrelationship of labor rights and private property with an apparent understanding that simply doing so negates any need to muster
444
principled reasons to overturn the Board.
Similar cases have emerged since Taft-Hartley. For example, a
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit drew on Fansteel to overturn a Board order reinstating strikers who threw objects
on the picket line where it was never clearly established what was
thrown, “how hard” it was thrown, or who the target was; and where

438
439
440
441
442
443
444

See infra notes 441–53 and accompanying text.
See id.
See id.
NLRB v. Perfect Circle Co., 162 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1947).
Id. at 568–69.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 568, 572–74.
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445

no real damage or injury was inflicted. In the court’s view, Fansteel
446
precluded the Board’s attempt to consider such subtleties. In similar fashion, the Second Circuit overturned a Board attempt to protect
the right of striking doctors to inform their employer’s potential pa447
tient-customers of their view of the quality of the hospital’s services.
Other courts have cited Fansteel and Southern Steamship when rejecting
the Board’s attempt to reinstate workers where the employee (a driver and union organizer) was discharged in clear violation of the sta448
tute but also could not qualify for company insurance coverage;
where the Board invoked the condonation doctrine to reinstate
workers fired for participating in a strike calculated to cause damage
449
to the employer’s plant; where the Board cited provocation to
reinstate strikers who had deterred a crossover by brandishing a rock
450
and briefly blocked access to the employer’s plant;
where the
Board, after placing such conduct in the context of typical picket-line
dynamics, ordered the reinstatement of strikers who used “unseemly
451
language” and assaulted a strikebreaker in a rather trivial fashion;
where the Board ordered the reinstatement, on grounds of condona452
tion, of strikers who blocked access to the employer’s business; and
where the Board ordered the reinstatement of strikers because the
453
employer had rehired other strikers guilty of similar misconduct.
To be sure, not all courts have second-guessed the Board in this
manner, and some courts have even sided with the Board in recognizing some limits in the degree to which Fansteel and Southern Steamship
454
Nevertheless, an overall trend is clearly
govern misconduct cases.
evident, whereby the courts have drawn on Fansteel and Southern

445

See Schreiber Mfg., Inc. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 413–15.
447
Montefiore Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 510, 516–17 (2d Cir. 1980).
448
Neb. Bulk Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1979).
449
NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1955).
450
NLRB v. Trumbull Asphalt Co. of Del., 327 F.2d 841, 844–46 (8th Cir. 1964).
451
NLRB v. Longview Furniture Co., 206 F.2d 274, 275–76 (4th Cir. 1953).
452
NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 213 F.2d 70, 74–75 (3d Cir. 1954).
453
Id. at 70.
454
See, e.g., Berbiglia, Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 1979); Donovan v.
NLRB, 520 F.2d 1316, 1323–24 (2d Cir. 1975). Needless to say, these cases have been
regularly cited for the similar purpose of upholding the Board’s refusal to reinstate
strikers for misconduct. See, e.g., Nat’l Conference of Firemen v. NLRB, 145 F.3d
380, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Gen. Teamsters Local No. 162 v. NLRB, 782 F.2d 839, 841
(9th Cir. 1986); Rd. Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. NLRB, 681 F.2d 11, 18
n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
446
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Steamship, above all, to guard against any attempt of the Board to revert to a kind of realistic administration of labor law.
A similar legacy of the sit-down strikes for modern labor law and
labor relations derives directly from Southern Steamship. The Supreme
Court’s decision in that case declared the Board’s attempt to reinstate
the striking seamen unlawful because the Board’s construction of the
labor law would have, in the court’s view, impermissibly subordinated
the federal mutiny law to the Wagner Act and to the Board’s own
455
construction of both statutes.
But rather than offering some
framework for reconciling this and related cases of conflict between
the Board’s authority under labor law and other federal policies, the
Court opined instead that in such cases, the Board’s authority under
456
the labor law must yield.
This rule has been used to place real limits on the Board’s remedial powers. Most notable is the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, where the Court declared that
the Board lacked the authority under any circumstances to order
reinstatement or back pay remedies to the benefit of undocumented
457
workers. Drawing explicitly on Southern Steamship (and more generally Fansteel), the Court reasoned that any other approach would nec458
essarily undermine the enforcement of the immigration laws.
Hoffman Plastic has been roundly criticized not only for placing undocumented workers outside the protections of the labor law, but also
for undermining both the immigration and labor laws by giving employers more reason to hire undocumented workers because they
459
cannot hold the employer to its obligations under the labor law. It
is difficult to gauge the overall effect of Southern Steamship (and Hoffman Plastic) on how the Board administers the Act in other contexts,
given that the decision, above all, instructs the Board to decline to assert its jurisdiction in the first place. Nevertheless, the issue has
emerged in Board decisions, perhaps most notably in a 2006 decision
in which it declined to reinstate twenty-three fish processors who had
460
been fired for engaging in a strike aboard ship. To reach this conclusion, the Board majority declared the processors to be “seamen”
455

See supra Part III.A.2.
See S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB (Southern Steamship), 316 U.S. 31, 48 (1938).
457
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 138 (2002).
458
Id. at 142–52.
459
See, e.g., Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 & n.15 (2003).
460
See generally Phoenix Processor Ltd. P’ship, 348 N.L.R.B. 28 (2006).
456
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within the meaning of Southern Steamship, depriving them of the right
to strike by that decision, despite the fact that the processors had
signed no shipping articles, had nothing to do with sailing the vessel,
were at-will employees (who enjoyed none of the protections unique
461
to seamen), and were never clearly ordered to return to work.
C. An Opened Door to State and Local Regulation of Labor Relations
Another important legacy of the sit-down strikes for modern labor law concerns preemption and state criminal prosecution. In the
appeal of their contempt convictions, the Fansteel strikers argued before the Illinois Court of Appeals that their prosecution for criminal
contempt was preempted by federal labor law; specifically, their claim
was that the dispute, which led to the strike, the injunction, and the
contempt proceedings, arose directly out of Fansteel’s ongoing violation of the Wagner Act, as well as an apparent claim that because the
Wagner Act vested exclusive jurisdiction of labor disputes with the
Board, the Illinois court could not assert jurisdiction consistent with
462
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
This contention raised serious questions, which the Illinois
Court of Appeals could not simply dismiss. For although the NorrisLaGuardia Act left intact the power of state courts to issue injunctions
in labor disputes, the extent of the Wagner Act’s preemptive effect
was not yet so clear. Moreover, unlike Norris-LaGuardia, which
sought simply to limit federal judicial involvement in labor disputes,
the Wagner Act undertook to regulate labor relations by the positive
assertion of administrative jurisdiction; and the employer had indeed
flouted such jurisdiction in the case at hand. Predictably the Illinois
court rejected the argument, declaring, first, that Congress could not
have contemplated such a preemptive effect and that Congress must
have expected that states would retain “their police power to protect
property rights or punish illegal acts committed in the course of labor
463
disputes.”
Second, the court surmised that if Congress had given
the Wagner Act such preemptive effect, doing so would have rendered the statute unconstitutional—presumably on federalism
464
grounds.

461

Id. at 29–31.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. Lodge 66 of the Amalgamated Ass’n of Iron,
Steel & Tin Workers, 14 N.E.2d 991, 993–94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938).
463
Id. at 994–95.
464
Id. at 994.
462
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Significantly, the Board showed no interest at all in supporting
SWOC’s position, either before the Illinois courts or in the way the
Board litigated its unfair labor practice case up to the Supreme
Court. The Board’s position in Fansteel and Southern Steamship, as well
as in the testimony of its top personnel before the Smith Committee
and other congressional investigations, was actually opposed to
465
preemption. In each of these contexts, the Board argued very specifically that its claim of authority to order reinstatement in cases of
sit-down strikes or other occasions of violence was actually all the
more legitimate—and all the more trustworthy as unthreatening to
order and property—in light of what it assumed to be the unfettered
prerogative of local, state, and federal officials to prosecute strikers
466
for criminal acts notwithstanding the Wagner Act.
Perhaps the
most explicit—and prescient—example of this position can be found
in the Board’s 1938 decision in Electric Boat Company, where the Board
justified the reinstatement of sit-down strikers on the ground that it
considered “local authorities” the proper arbiters of the “seriousness”
of the underlying conduct; if local authorities refused to take the
misconduct seriously enough to warrant arrest or prosecution, then,
the Board concluded, there could be no reason for it to deny reins467
tatement.
Congressional opponents of the Taft-Hartley amendments would apply a similar kind of reasoning to reinstatement law
468
and attempts to statutorily outlaw sit-down strikes.
This accommodating attitude to the enforcement of state criminal law in the context of labor disputes cleared the way for this practice to emerge as a major exception to the broader principle that
such intrusions into federal jurisdiction are unconstitutional. The
first clear articulation of this notion would come in the 1942 Supreme Court decision Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Em469
ployment Relations Board. The case actually did not involve the criminal law, but rather the enforcement of state unfair labor practice
provisions against a local union for a variety of alleged actions, including mass picketing, threats to crossovers, and damage to the em-

465
See Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong. 3108–09
(1947); H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 82–83 (1937), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, at
355, 373–74; Brief for the NLRB at 55–56, Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 306
U.S. 240 (1939) (No. 436); Brief for the NLRB at 58, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB (Southern
Steamship), 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).
466
See sources cited supra note 465.
467
In re Elec. Boat Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 572, 593 (1938).
468
See, e.g., Byron B. Harlan, Commentary, 16 CONG. DIG. 156, 156–57 (1937).
469
315 U.S. 740 (1942).
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470

ployer’s property. While the parties to the labor dispute were clearly within the jurisdictional reach of the Wagner Act, the Court saw no
471
manifest conflict between federal and state jurisdiction. Moreover,
the Court cited a passage from a Senate Committee Report which
denied that the Wagner Act would function as an assertion of police
power in its own right; the report noted further that existing judicial
and law enforcement institutions, including local police, were ade472
quate to deal with “fraud, violence or threats of violence.”
Of
course such language is open to different interpretations, including
being read to say merely that Congress wished to underscore the limited kind of power the Wagner Act would give the Board in labor
disputes. For the Court, though, the passage expressed a more convenient point: that Congress meant to leave to state and local governments considerable authority to deal with labor disputes, particularly where the jurisdiction “was exercising its historical powers over
such traditional local matters as public safety and order and the use
473
of streets and highways.”
This argument, which directly informed the Court’s decision to
uphold Wisconsin’s assertion of jurisdiction, seemed to legitimize the
state’s role in the Fansteel strike and other sit-down strikes where the
police evacuated, or tried to evacuate, the strikers. Not coincidently,
the Fansteel decision itself played a role in the litigation of AllenBradley Local 1111, as the Supreme Court briefs of both the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board and the Allen-Bradley Company argued
that just as Fansteel limited the labor rights of strikers engaged in illegal conduct under the federal labor law, it also legitimized a similar
474
determination by a state labor agency. Indeed, with some cogency
the company’s brief pointed out that if a state could arrest and prosecute strikers, such as occurred in Fansteel, then it should also be able
to subject strikers to the less severe sanctions imposed by its labor
475
board.
In the decade or so after Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, the Court
decided a series of cases in which it expanded the prerogative of state

470

Id. at 742–44.
Id. at 748–49.
472
Id. at 748 n.7; S. REP. NO. 74-573, at 16 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note
394, at 2300, 2315–16.
473
Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, 315 U.S. at 749.
474
Brief of Respondent Allen-Bradley Co. at 38–40, Allen-Bradley Local, 315 U.S.
740 (No. 252); Brief of Respondent Wisconsin Employment Relations Board at 14,
107–08, Allen-Bradley Local, 315 U.S. 740 (No. 252).
475
Brief of Respondent Allen-Bradley Company, supra note 474, at 38–39.
471
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intervention in labor disputes to the point that states were permitted
even to enforce their own unfair labor practice provisions in cases of
476
picket-line violence. Unsurprisingly, both Fansteel and Southern
Steamship figured prominently in UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employ477
ment Relations Board, which in many ways was the most dramatic example from this line of cases. There the Court cited its sit-down
strike decisions for the proposition that federal law could not
preempt Wisconsin’s regulation of intermittent, arbitrary strikes because, among other reasons, the Board could not lawfully regulate
478
such strikes. In 1976, in a move that signaled a more skeptical view
of particularized forms of state regulation of aspects of labor disputes
already governed by the federal law, the Court overruled this deci479
sion.
Nevertheless, since Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, preemption law
has also evolved along a different axis, which has opened even greater
opportunities for state and local governments to define the right to
strike. The Supreme Court has confirmed the idea that Allen-Bradley
Local No. 1111 gives state and local governments broad license to enforce their basic criminal laws in the context of labor disputes, an
idea perhaps most decisively articulated in one of the Court’s more
important decision on labor preemption, San Diego Building and
480
Trades Council v. Garmon.
In Garmon, which established the basic
framework for analyzing labor preemption questions, the Court reiterated the notion seen in Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 that “where the
regulated conduct touch[es] conduct so deeply rooted in local feel481
ing and responsibility,” preemption could never be inferred; and
the Court likewise affirmed that states have essentially unfettered au-

476
Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 suggested that states could regulate labor relations
by adopting their own labor codes and accompanying administrative structures, so
long as doing so did not excessively impinge on the federal regime. Several times in
the 1940s and 1950s, the Court considered how far the states could go in this regard.
For example, in 1956 the Court upheld the authority of the Wisconsin board to enjoin violent labor protest, notwithstanding that such conduct was clearly subject to
section 8(b)(1)(A). The Court reasoned that Wisconsin’s authority to enjoin such
conduct was merely a correlate of its “unquestioned” interest in “preventing violence
and property damage” by means of its criminal laws. UAW v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 274–75 (1956).
477
336 U.S. 245 (1949).
478
Id. at 256–57 (1949).
479
Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 427 U.S. 132, 154 (1976).
480
359 U.S. 236 (1959).
481
Id. at 244.
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thority to “act[] through laws of broad general application.”
Garmon presented those permissible assertions of state authority as limited exceptions to a broader rule preempting the enforcement of
state laws, even if general in nature, that impinge on the statute’s
483
scheme for defining and enforcing basic labor rights.
This approach has repeatedly confirmed the authority of state and local governments to enforce their laws precisely as they had in Fansteel. Significantly, the Court has approved of such jurisdiction even where the
conduct in question constitutes an unfair labor practice under the
federal labor law—and would seem to be preempted according to the
conventional analysis laid out in Garmon—provided only that such
conduct involves “mass picketing, violence, and overt threats of vi484
olence.”
Elsewhere, the Court has allowed states to prosecute for
trespass strikers engaged in peaceful, orderly picketing, even where
labor law arguably both protected and prohibited the picketing—and
485
again would seem preempted by the usual application of Garmon.
These cases actually only begin to suggest how commonplace the
arrest and prosecution of strikers has been since 1937. No comprehensive accounting of such events has ever been conducted. But a
review of newspaper records and other published accounts confirms—even in recent times—the arrest of thousands of workers on
charges of assault, trespass, blocking public thoroughfares, and so
486
forth. Often this has involved mass arrests, sometimes of hundreds

482

Id.
Id. at 243–46.
484
UAW v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 274 (1956).
485
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 198 (1978).
486
For recent examples of arrest for assault and similar charges, see Associated
Press, RMI Titanium, Striking Workers Reach Deal on Wages, Pensions, AKRON BEACON J.,
Apr. 10, 1999, at D8; Peter Y. Hong, Jesse Jackson Leads Striking Janitors’ Protest, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2000, at 1; Christopher Keating, Two Arrested Pratt Strikers Released With
Warning, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 5, 2001, at B3; Michelle L. Klampe, Union OKs
Contract at Auburn Foundry, FORT WAYNE SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 1999, at 1A; Terry Prestin,
Consumers Feel Service Delays from Strike at Bell Atlantic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1998, at B1;
Kristin Stafanova, End of Strike at Verizon Not at Hand; Workers Seek Temporary Jobs,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at B8; Ian Swanson, Worker Who Crossed Picket Line Tells of
Retribution, GRAND FORKS HERALD, June 5, 1999, at 2; Candus Thompson, Anger Builds
Among Brick Workers, BALT. SUN, Aug. 17, 1999, at 1A. For examples involving blocking streets and similar charges, see Associated Press, Casino Striker Injured at Picket
Line, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at 4C; Steven Greenhouse, Deal
Ends Strike by Fairfield County Janitors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at B10; Protesters
Charged After Blocking Street, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Dec. 2, 2005, at B01; David Reyes, 15
Arrested During Rally for Supermarket Strikers, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 6; Madelaine
Vitale, Local 54 to Plead Guilty in Atlantic City Sit-In, PRESS ATLANTIC CITY, March 8,
483
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of workers at once. In the early years of the Wagner Act, such arrests
487
were commonplace. Notably, though, mass arrests in labor disputes
continue even in recent times, as was the case in the Hormel meat488
packers strike in the mid-1980s, the Pittston Coal strike of 1989 and
489
490
1990, the New York Newsday strike of 1990 and 1991, and the De491
troit newspaper strike in the mid-and late 1990s. The Pittston strike
alone resulted in as many as 4000 arrests of union members and their
492
supporters.
Where not arrested and prosecuted in conventional fashion,
strikers and their allies have faced criminal charges in the fashion of
the Fansteel strikers, such as charges of contempt of state court injunctions. While the Norris-LaGuardia Act always applied only to the
federal courts, in the 1930s many states adopted so-called “Little Norris-LaGuardia Acts,” which have limited their courts’ equitable juris493
diction over labor disputes. Nevertheless, even these statutes never
limited the power of courts to enjoin strikes that are deemed violent,
destructive, or otherwise criminal in nature, or that feature mass
picketing; further, state courts have tended to construe their license
494
to issue injunctions under such circumstances quite broadly.
As

2005, at A1. For an example of trespass charges, see Angela Couloumbis, Display of
Solidarity for Striking Wawa Workers, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 11, 1999, at B01;.
487
Such mass arrests were commonplace in the early years of the Wagner Act. An
apt example already mentioned is the 1946 Allis-Chalmers strike. See sources cited
supra notes 357–58. A strike against Columbia Pictures that same year also resulted
in mass arrests. See 700 Film Strike Pickets Arrested, supra note 358; 219 Arrested in Columbia Studio Strike, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1946, at 1. Hundreds of these protesters were
eventually put on trial. See Studio Mass Trial Underway, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1943, at 1.
488
See Conrad deFiebre, Hormel Protesters Arrested After Blockade, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIB., Mar. 21, 1986, at 1A (reporting twenty-two jailed); David Hage, Police, Hormel
Protesters Clash, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Apr. 12, 1986, at 1A.
489
See Associated Press, Pickets Arrested for Blocking Pittston Mine, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Oct. 26, 1989, at A8; Kenneth C. Crowe, Coal Strike’s New Arrests,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 24, 1989, at 47; Bill McKelway, Judge Declines to Say What Will Resolve
Fines, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 14, 1990, at B1; Ron Urban, Coal Strike Resists
Settlement, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 15, 1989, at 1A.
490
See David Gonzalez & James C. McKinley, Jr., Violence and the News Strike: Anger,
Blame and Distrust, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1991, at 1.
491
See James Bennet, After 7 Weeks Detroit Newspaper Strike Takes a Violent Turn, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, at A21; 65 Arrested in Detroit Strike, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 29,
1991, at C7.
492
MAIER B. FOX, UNITED WE STAND: THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, 1890–
1990, at 530 (1990).
493
Note, Current Legislative and Judicial Restrictions on State Labor Injunction Acts, 53
YALE L.J. 553, 553–54 (1944).
494
Benjamin Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts—Part I: A Survey, 50 VA. L.
REV. 951, 977–78 (1964); Benjamin Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts—Part
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with traditional criminal jurisdiction, the courts have consistently
found that the federal labor statute does not typically preempt the as495
sertion of such jurisdiction.
These rules have given courts broad license to enjoin strikes, including the ability to prevent strikers from deterring the use of replacements and crossovers by means of violence, mass picketing, or
496
other conduct that might deter replacements and crossovers. Strikers who defy these injunctions expose themselves to both criminal
497
and civil contempt sanctions.
However it occurs, the effects of bringing criminal sanctions to
bear in labor disputes go far beyond the punishment of individual offenders. Arrests, even if they do not result in serious fines or jail
time, have disruptive effects that can undermine a union’s entire protest campaign, particularly when large numbers of strikers are arrested, when arrests focus on union leaders, or when arrests at an especially critical stage. Moreover, the enforcement of the criminal law
inevitably has a deterrent effect on other unionists who recognize the
potentially enormous personal costs of militant protest, especially
when those costs include a strong probability of unemployment.

II: A Critique, 50 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (1964); James B. Atleson, The Legal Community
and the Transformation of Disputes: The Settlement of Injunction Actions, 23 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 41, 41–42 (1989); Eileen Silverstein, Collective Action, Property Rights and Law
Reform: The Story of the Labor Injunction, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 97, 113–40
(1993).
495
See United Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers v. Wis. Empl. Rel. Bd.,
351 U.S. 266 (1956).
496
United Mine Workers, Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274 (Wyo.
1989); Ormet Aluminum Mill Prods. Corp. v. United Steelworkers, No. 05-MO-1,
2006 WL 2045811 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 2006); Smitty’s Super Markets, Inc. v. Retail Store Employees Local 322, 637 S.W.2d 148, 156–57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Peterson, 61 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946); Greg Bozell, Locked Out in
Illinois: “How Can They Do That to a Community?,” THE PROGRESSIVE, Dec. 1, 2005, at 27;
Judge Grants Injunction Limiting Number of Pickets, CINCINNATI POST, Oct. 25, 2006, at
C10; David Robb, Court Guards ABC News Shoots, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 19, 1998, at 1.
497
See, e.g., Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace &
Agric. Implement Workers, Local 486, 573 N.E.2d 98 (Ohio 1991) (sentencing strikers to thirty days plus fines for criminal contempt); Kaiser Aluminium & Chem.
Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 785 So. 2d 238 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (sentencing union
members to forty-eight hours for criminal contempt); Mosler, Inc. v. United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, Local 1862, 633 N.E.2d 1193 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993) (overturning union officer’s sentence of five days in jail for assault in violation of injunction); Nat’l Metalcrafters v. Local 449, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 465 N.E.2d. 1001 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (sentencing union member to sixty days for criminal contempt); Ron Clayton, Judge Fines
Labor Union, Leader for Violence at Polk Picket Line, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, May 30,
1997, at A4 (local union president sentenced to 10 days and $10,000 fine for picketline violence in contempt; sentenced conditionally suspended).
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The role of the sit-down strikes in facilitating this state of affairs
might initially seem attenuated. Neither Fansteel nor Southern Steamship established any direct precedent authorizing the assertion of
state and local criminal justice authority in labor disputes. Instead,
these cases (and the Board) took for granted the legitimacy of such
practice. One does not have to believe that state and local governments should never be involved in labor disputes to see that such unfettered involvement exacts adverse consequences on labor rights. In
some ways, the Board could not have conceived a better occasion to
make this argument than in Fansteel. It could have emphasized before the courts how seriously the local police and the Lake County
court had actually aggravated the dispute by their involvement and
further marginalized the Board itself from its effort to administer the
statute, and it could have demanded, on that ground, that the police
and local courts be required to abstain until the Board had done its
work under the Act. This is, in fact, exactly the argument that the union made in its unsuccessful attempt to appeal the strikers’ contempt
498
convictions to the Supreme Court. Of course, this argument probably would not have prevailed, given the ultimate disposition of the
courts in these cases. Had the Board pressed the argument, however,
it might have provoked a political debate about the proper role of the
police and courts in post-Wagner Act labor disputes. More critically,
the Board might thereby have legitimized the further litigation of an
important question: how can the authority of local police and courts
be reconciled with the basic labor rights protected by the statute?
The Board could have potentially situated itself as a legitimate arbiter
of this question.
As it was, the Board took a very different course; it tried to bolster its own authority by conceding the authority of local and state
governments and then attempting to situate itself as an adjunct to
such authority. In so doing, it not only took for granted the unfettered legitimacy of police and court involvement in labor disputes,
but it also conceded to those who opposed the Board’s attempt to establish a robust system of labor rights as a backhanded means of challenging this effort. What has happened since is that, as the Board’s
authority and legitimacy in labor disputes have declined, the overall
power and prestige of police and other law enforcement institutions
(if not also courts) have increased. It is in this context that the police
and courts have reemerged as virtually unquestioned arbiters of labor
498
See Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. Lodge 66 of the Amalgamated Ass’n of Iron,
Steel & Tin Workers, 14 N.E.2d 991, 993–94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S.
642 (1939).
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rights in the context of strikes, entitled to bring their authority to
bear ahead of the Board itself.
V. CONCLUSION: CHARTING THE BOUNDARIES OF LIBERAL
LABOR LAW
More than seventy years after the sit-down strikes helped inaugurate a functional system of labor rights, their legacy consists of a reactionary program that casts militant forms of labor protest outside the
domain of protected labor conduct and confines the right to strike to
a narrow range of utterly passive tactics. Of course, this program has
not been completely successful; sit-down strikes continued to occur
499
for years after Taft-Hartley. Even more common, as the preceding
section suggests, have been the other forms of protest prohibited in
the wake of the sit-down strikes, including quickie sit-downs, mass
picketing, countless acts of misconduct, and, occasionally, even orga500
nized strike violence. But these are definitely exceptions. In recent
years, sit-down strikes have been so uncommon that the recent occurrence of a very modest sit-down at a small plant in Chicago provoked
501
surprise and befuddlement in the national media.
Even lesser
forms of militant protest, like mass picketing, have become relatively
uncommon in the face of possible job loss and criminal prosecution.
For decades after the changes framed by conservative reaction to
the sit-down strikes were fully realized in the Taft-Hartley amendments, the amendments had little obvious effect on labor relations.
Union membership continued to expand towards a high (measured
in percentage of workers) not reached until the mid-1950s. But appearances are often deceiving, as this anti-militancy program has actually had important and lasting consequences—in two interrelated
ways. First, there is good reason to believe that this program helped
alter the character of the labor movement over the long term. Most
important in this regard is the eventual collapse of the CIO as an independent labor federation. Although many things influenced its
499

American Safety Razor Seeks Injunction to End Sit-Down Strike, WALL ST. J. Oct. 5,
1954, at 3 (reporting that 650 workers were directly involved); N.Y. Shipbuilding Shuts
Camden Yard, Charges Union Seized Plant, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1954, at 2; Permutit Co.
Hit by Sit-Down Strike of 100 Employees, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1954, at 1; Harvester to Furlough About 9,000 at Three Plants by Monday, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 6, 1952, at 2 (reporting
that over 100 workers were involved). All of the news stories reported sit-down
strikes of at least twenty-four hours.
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See, e.g., Zetka, supra note 262, at 215 (tallying “more than 400 wildcat strikes”
in automobile production between 1946 and 1963).
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See, e.g., Michael Luo & Karen Ann Cullotta, Even Workers Surprised by Success of
Factory Sit-In, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at A9.
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eventual re-merger with the AFL, one factor undoubtedly was the
CIO’s inability to bring its greater acumen with militant tactics to
bear in jurisdictional and organizational disputes. The prohibition of
labor militancy probably also helped change the character of the
American labor movement on a more fundamental level, simply by
discouraging militancy. This judgment fits with critical literature that
identifies the laws’ progressive narrowing of the right to strike as a
mechanism that has compromised labor’s ability to maintain organizing momentum, build solidarity, and challenge employer hegemony
within the workplace; instead, this literature argues, labor is left more
502
and more to pursue narrow economic gains. The legacy of the sitdown strike certainly accords with this thesis, in that the legal response to the strikes not only prohibited direct challenges to employer control evident in the sit-down strikes themselves, but facilitated a
very literal narrowing of the domain of strike activity in a fashion that
has all but prohibited the kind of mass action that unions need if they
are to build genuine solidarity. Likewise, by grounding the prohibition of quickie sit-downs, the response to sit-down strikes deprived
unions of lawful access to the ideal weapon for challenging employer
control within the workplace.
A second and more immediate consequence of the sit-down
strikes’ anti-strike legacy is that it has deprived organized labor of tactics that are desperately needed to maintain labor’s relevance in the
twenty-first century. A resumption of open warfare between workers
and management superseded the long détente between labor and
capital inaugurated by the 1949 “Treaty of Detroit.” It is, of course, a
war of unequals, as employers use not only their inherent advantages
as employers, but also their rights under the law to continue operating with crossovers and replacements. And many employers further
bolster these advantages by routinely violating the labor law, harassing and discharging workers, and refusing to bargain. In other
words, the landscape of industrial relations today resembles in many
ways the situation that gave rise to the sit-down strikes in the first
place. The difference now, of course, is that sit-down strikes, mass
picketing, and other militant tactics that countered these practices in
the 1930s are today thoroughly prohibited by the law. Moreover,
now, unlike in the New Deal era, this policy appears not as a one-
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In addition to the work by Klare and Pope, cited throughout this Article, see
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REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 32 (1976); Holly J. McCammon, Legal Limits on Labor Militancy: U.S. Labor Law and the Right to Strike Since the New Deal, 37 SOC. PROBS. 206
(1990).
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sided confirmation of the law’s fundamental hostility to labor rights,
but rather as a reasonable attempt to circumscribe the boundaries of
labor protest.
In this light, the use of the sit-down strikes to frame a narrowing
of the right to strike also reveals something unique and important
about the state of labor rights in capitalist society. For, more than
any other practice of labor militancy or any other area of labor
reform, the sit-down strikes forced the courts, the Congress, and the
Board to confront squarely the limits of labor rights. The reason for
this concerns the right to strike, which the labor law not only purports to guarantee but situates as a union’s primary weapon. In modern labor law the right to strike is the mainspring of the entire regime
of labor rights, including the right to provoke meaningful collective
503
bargaining. At the same time, however, the labor law also defers to
the traditional property and contract rights of employers, including
the right of employers to continue business operations during a strike
with crossovers and replacement workers (who, in the case of eco504
nomic strikes, may permanently displace strikers from their jobs).
This reflects a rejection of the corporatist approach to labor relations
common in varying degrees in most other countries with functional
systems of labor law, by which basic labor rights are buttressed with a
variety of legal limits on employers’ traditional prerogatives to continue operation, bargain to impasse, withdraw recognition, and so
505
forth.
This fundamentally liberal approach to labor rights contradictorily venerates the right to strike while offering striking workers few
means of realizing the right beyond the one epitomized in the sitdown strikes. For without the benefit of corporatist protections, labor
rights, including the right to strike, are simply and quite lawfully negated by traditional employer prerogatives. An employer can break
most strikes merely by exercising its right to resume operations, and a
union essentially has no viable means of countering this. Workers
seldom possess skills so rare that qualified replacement workers cannot be found in numbers sufficient at least to demoralize the strikers.
503

For a statement of this principle by the Supreme Court, see NLRB v. Ins.
Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 483–85 (1960).
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NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938); JAMES B. ATLESON,
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 21–24 (1983).
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For a concise description of the differences between these models, see Tamara
Lothian, The Political Consequences of Labor Regimes: The Contractual and Corporatist Modes Compared, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001, 1005–11 (1986). On the defining features of
the American system, as articulated in the ideology of liberalism, see PETRO, supra
note 9.
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Equally improbable is that a union might rely on moral suasion and
political education to deter crossovers and replacement workers.
Such appeals, which already deviate from a mass-produced culture
(and a semi-official ideology) that disparages acts of solidarity and sacrifice, and which must contend with employers’ formidable advantages in propagandizing, can seldom overcome the more practical
realities of genuine need among a hard-pressed working class—or,
for that matter, the felt needs of workers in a consumer society.
The one thing that workers can do is flout the law in a bid to rewrite the rules of industrial relations and challenge the factors that
make solidarity so deviant in the first place. In a full appreciation of
this (and the jurisprudential forms that it often embraced), Pope’s
most recent work on the sit-down strikes aptly describes the 1930s
506
strikes as exercises in “worker lawmaking.” One can go a step further and discern the same project in other forms of strike-related
misconduct. The worker who menaces a crossover, blocks a road, or
hurls a brick at a carload of replacement workers is, in a very real
sense, attempting to realize in full a right to strike that is otherwise
only partially (fraudulently?) provided by the law itself. But of course
such conduct is far more likely nowadays to land a striker in jail or
cause her to lose her job than change the balance of power in a labor
dispute.
Short of overthrowing capitalism and its legal order, the only
apparent solution to this dilemma is to reform the labor law itself.
The labor law might be redrafted such that it more thoroughly limits
employer prerogatives in the arena of labor disputes. This has already been attempted, most notably by efforts to repeal the replace507
ment worker doctrine and, more recently, by attempts to further
constrain how employers respond to organizing campaigns and how
508
A more promisthey conduct themselves in collective bargaining.
ing approach would involve revisiting Fansteel and Southern Steamship
and their progeny. The legal controversies surrounding the sit-down
strikes, it will be recalled, were never really about anything so bold as
legalizing the right to sit-down strikes, or for that matter picket-line
violence, strike-related crimes, or conduct of this kind, but rather
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Pope, supra note 3.
The most recent efforts of real consequence occurred in 1992 and 1994 with
attempts to pass various iterations of the Workplace Fairness Act. S. 55, 102nd Cong.
(1992); H.R. 5, 103rd Cong. (1993); Striker Replacement Act, S. 55, 103rd Cong.
(1994).
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centered on the limits of the Board’s authority to administer the statute in a realistic and balanced way that successfully navigated the
tumultuous realities of labor disputes. If the Board were allowed the
authority it sought in those cases, perhaps it could achieve some
meaningful balance of labor rights against traditional property rights,
order, and authority.
These reforms are quite unlikely to come about and not certain
to benefit labor even if they did. Each contemplates a retreat from
the law’s traditional, liberal approach to labor relations that is fraught
with risks for workers and unions. Corporatist labor laws inevitably
pair the aggressive protection of labor rights with equally aggressive
limits on union militancy and political opposition. And it is almost
certain in this sense that if such reforms were adopted, they would
surely not rehabilitate—or even tolerate—the kind of strident militancy embodied in the sit-down strikes. Aside from having to overcome the obvious class allegiance of the modern state, sanctioning
this kind of conduct would not only entail an unthinkable confession
of the violence that inheres, un-remedied by law, in modern labor relations, but also represents a breach of the social compact that is fundamental to the corporatist concept.
I conclude this Article with a brief reflection on the fundamental
tragedy of this whole affair. The sit-down strikes quite literally made
possible the rise of industrial unionism and the reign of an effective
regime of labor law. They arguably secured the legal foundations of
the modern administrative state. In these respects, they helped build
a system of labor relations and labor law that indelibly altered the political economy and social fabric of post-war America. The strikes
helped overcome the entrenched resistance of reactionary employers,
judges, politicians, and rival unions. The irony and the tragedy, of
course, is that these same anti-union elements quickly and deftly
seized on the strikes to frame a powerful anti-union agenda. We have
seen how they used the jurisprudence that arose around the strikes
themselves to craft their program, and how they likewise converted
the sit-down strikes into an enduring and eminently effective symbol
of supposed excesses of organized labor, the NLRB, and ultimately
the labor law itself. In all this there is both a shining affirmation of
the strength that labor can wield through resistance and rebellion
and an even more salient confirmation of labor’s fundamental subjugation in modern, capitalist society.

